



Interview Summary: Former Chief Peter Sloly (Ottawa Police Service)

Former Chief Peter Sloly was interviewed by Frank Au, Natalia Rodriguez, Mark Pritchard, Eric Brousseau, Jean-Simon Schoenholz, Sajeda Hedaraly, and Misha Boutilier on August 23, August 26, September 14, and October 5, 2022. Questions about this summary should be directed to Frank Au.

Former Chief Sloly participated in these interviews with limited access to the relevant records and without the benefit of his meeting notes.

Background

Experience at Toronto Police Service

Chief Sloly joined the Toronto Police Service (**TPS**) in 1988. He initially worked in two downtown TPS divisions, and later shifted to 51 Division, where he worked with then-Staff Inspector Bill Blair. He was subsequently appointed staff sergeant and led 13 Division for a short period of time. When Julian Fantino became TPS Chief, Chief Sloly was formally promoted to inspector. He served as duty inspector for evenings and nights, and was the default incident commander for incidents like major shootings. In 1999, he joined 31 Division where he was second in command and served in support of a large guns and gangs project. He was also a trained Incident Commander who was occasionally called in to support a public order unit (**POU**) and was responsible for policing a large convoy of trucks that were protesting during a fuel crisis. He stated that he used negotiations, intelligence informed threat risk assessment and logistics related tactics which were consistent with Incident Command System (**ICS**) techniques which would later formally be adopted by the TPS.

In 2001-2002, Chief Sloly served as a command staff member in the Civilian Police Force of the UN's peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo. He worked on large integrated operations and planned for large-scale events which included rioting and attacks on the Civilian Police force. He characterized his role in Kosovo as the best professional and personal experience he ever had.

In 2002, Chief Sloly returned to TPS, was promoted to staff inspector, and began working in the corporate communications unit under Chief Fantino. He participated in international development missions to Lithuania and the Caribbean and developed an international network of police, justice, and military experts. He continued his part-time role as a POU incident commander and was involved in policing state visits and local demonstrations during this period, including the January-February 2009 protests against the Sri Lankan Civil War. When Bill Blair became TPS Chief in 2005, he promoted Chief Sloly to staff superintendent. In 2007, Chief Sloly took over special operations, including special events and public order. In late 2009, the TPS Board promoted Chief Sloly to Deputy Chief. Chief



Sloly served as TPS Deputy Chief between 2009 and 2016. During this period, he ran the professional standards unit, led frontline and field operations, and ran corporate projects.

Chief Sloly applied for TPS Chief in 2015 but was not successful. In 2016, he left TPS and joined Deloitte as a partner.

Incident Command Training and Experience

Chief Sloly stated that he was given the responsibility of overseeing an overhaul of the TPS's POU command and control system while acting as the Staff Superintendent overseeing Special Operations. This process led to the adoption of the ICS model of incident command at TPS to replace the gold-silver-bronze incident command model, which Chief Sloly characterized as outdated. Chief Sloly selected the British Columbia Institute of Justice to train a new incident command cadre of senior police officers up to the highest ICS level, namely level 400. Between 2007 and 2008, Chief Sloly completed ICS Levels 100 through 400 at that institute as well as other ICS related training and certification.

Between 2007 and 2009, Chief Sloly successfully advocated for the adoption of the ICS model nationally. He worked with former Ottawa Police Service (**OPS**) Deputy Chief Sue O'Sullivan and now-House of Commons Sergeant at Arms Pat McDonnell on this initiative. At the time, Chief Sloly was one of the most experienced and knowledgeable incident commanders in Canada.

Appointment as Ottawa Police Service Chief & Initial Tenure as Chief

In June 2019, Chief Sloly was approached to apply to serve as Chief of the Ottawa Police Service (**OPS**). He declined because there were two potential internal candidates for the position Deputy Chiefs Steve Bell and Uday Jaswal. An executive search firm and Ottawa Police Services Board (**OPSB**) chair Diane Deans approached Chief Sloly again later in 2019 after Deputy Chief Jaswal removed himself from the competition. Chief Sloly and Deputy Chief Bell both applied for the position. Chief Sloly was successful and was appointed OPS Chief in October 2019.

Chief Sloly was being brought into OPS as an outsider, an agent of change with a change management mandate from the OPSB. When he became Chief, OPS was facing significant challenges, including low morale, equity/diversity/inclusion issues, and lack of public trust, especially within racialized and marginalized communities within Ottawa. These challenges intensified during his tenure as Chief due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the murder of George Floyd, and the resulting Black Lives Matter, defund and abolish police movements.

There was significant turnover in Chief Sloly's command team before the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa. Deputy Chief Jaswal was suspended in March 2020, and Chief Sloly began using rotating superintendents to fill that Deputy Chief role because no replacement was provided by the OPSB. Similarly, OPSB released the OPS Chief Administrative Officer (**CAO**), Jeff Letourneau, in May 2021, and Chief Sloly had to assign



Deputy Chief Bell to serve as CAO until a replacement, Blair Dunker, joined OPS in December 2021. Chief Sloly tried to solidify the command team by engaging in group team-building efforts, as well as one-on-one mentorship and small group efforts.

OPS lost experienced officers before the Freedom Convoy arrived due to retirements. He noted that younger OPS officers stepped up to fill the gaps these experienced officers left and for the most part proved themselves capable.

OPS was not functioning optimally, was not well resourced, and its leadership was stretched at the time the Freedom Convoy arrived. Many police services in Canada face these challenges and OPS officers demonstrated great potential in managing high-stress, crisis environments.

Relationships with Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson

Chief Sloly viewed Deputy Chief Bell as a capable Deputy who had served in all three of the command positions during Chief Sloly's tenure as OPS Chief. Deputy Chief Bell still needed mentoring and coaching to be an effective executive level leader, which Chief Sloly attempted to provide. At the time of the Freedom Convoy, Deputy Chief Bell was overseeing the command that included intelligence.

Chief Sloly also viewed Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson as a capable leader who was a good communicator, was emotionally intelligent, and performed well after Chief Sloly promoted her to superintendent in 2020. In January 2022, she began to serve a 3-month assignment as Acting Deputy Chief to fill the vacancy left by Deputy Chief Jaswal's ongoing suspension. She had oversight responsibility over operations and special events.

Role of CACP National Framework and PLT at OPS

At the time of the Freedom Convoy, Chief Sloly was not familiar with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police National Framework on Police Preparedness for Demonstrations and Assemblies (**National Framework**).¹ Chief Sloly reviewed the National Framework before the interview and observed that it contained best practices that were neither new nor surprising to him. He was familiar with the measured approach principle the National Framework adopted, and this principle is standard in policing for multiple types of crises.

Chief Sloly observed the OPS Police Liaison Team (**PLT**) in action in 2020 and 2021 before the Freedom Convoy arrived. OPS had a formalized PLT that went beyond what he had experienced at TPS. OPS PLT successfully facilitated a peaceful protest in Ottawa by supporters of the Wet'suwet'en in early 2020, and helped manage tensions that emerged when interprovincial bridges in Ottawa were shut due to COVID-19. He was

¹ COM00000666.



aware that PLT members received training, but he was not aware if they were trained on the National Framework document in particular.

OPS command staff, including Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, completed a CIC course. It was not possible to ensure that every OPS command staff member was sufficiently trained in the role of PLT. Training, while important, cannot be the singular solution to the issues facing modern policing. Improvement in police efficacy requires investment to address structural issues around information sharing, standardization and integration.

Experience with OPS Public Order Officers

OPS has an Emergency Services Unit (**ESU**), which is the functional equivalent of a POU. Chief Sloly attended ESU training sessions, observed ESU in action during numerous operations, and spoke regularly with ESU's commander, Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll. The ESU officers he interacted with were very professional, well-trained, and well-equipped. They were experienced because OPS used ESU to respond to events such as large-scale searches and kidnappings in addition to public order events. He attributed ESU's underperformance during the fall 2021 Panda Bowl to problems at the inspector/superintendent level on that occasion, rather than problems among the ESU's members.

Pre-Arrival Intelligence

On January 13, 2022, Chief Sloly learned that the Freedom Convoy was travelling to Ottawa when he, like the Chiefs of other major Ontario Police Services, received a report on the Freedom Convoy from Project Hendon, an intelligence sharing network led by the Ontario Provincial Police (**OPP**). Chief Sloly forwarded the Project Hendon report to Deputy Chief Bell.

The January 13 Project Hendon report triggered the start of OPS's planning and intelligence threat risk assessment cycle. Around January 13, Chief Sloly assigned Deputy Chief Bell responsibility to gather intelligence on the Freedom Convoy and to prepare an intelligence led threat/risk assessment (**TRA**). He also assigned Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson responsibility for operations and planning for the Freedom Convoy. Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson served as the major incident commander (**MIC**) throughout the Freedom Convoy.

Sources of Intelligence

Chief Sloly stated that he received intelligence from a range of sources on the Freedom Convoy. For example, he was on the distribution list for intelligence reports from Project Hendon, the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (**ITAC**). In addition, he received intelligence and TRA briefings from Deputy Chief Bell and the OPS's corporate communications team which monitored mainstream and social media relating to the convoys.



Role of Project Hendon Reports in Intelligence

Chief Sloly confirmed that he received all of the Project Hendon reports that OPP sent concerning the Freedom Convoy. He expected that Deputy Chief Bell and one or more of his subordinates in the Intelligence Directorate sought, received and read these reports in detail.

During the interview, Chief Sloly was shown and asked about specific portions of the Project Hendon reports dated January 20, 22, 26, and 28, 2022. Commission counsel was not in a position to show Chief Sloly the entirety of these Hendon reports during his interviews.

The “Assessment” section of the January 20 Project Hendon report contains the following statement:²

The noted convoys will almost certainly disrupt the movement of vehicular traffic and goods in Ontario and strain the capacity of law enforcement in the province. Supporters of the initiative may impede vehicular traffic at the local level.

It is also possible that some participants of the convoys may attempt to disrupt the workings of government at both the provincial and federal levels.

Chief Sloly indicated, in relation to the first paragraph, that he agreed with this assessment, and that almost all medium or large-scale protest in Ontario impact vehicular traffic and strain police capacity.

The “Tactical Considerations” section of the January 22 Project Hendon report contains the following statement:³

- Organizers in Ottawa are referred to as the “War Room”.
- Port-a-potties, fencing, and security has been arranged for Ottawa.
- National organizer from Alberta will be travelling with a command post, media and security detail.

Chief Sloly observed that, while much of this information was not unusual for a major protest, the statements about the “War Room” and the security detail were out of the ordinary. The reference to the “War Room” suggested that organizers had some ability to exercise command and control over protestors, which was not typical for protests. He did not specifically recall being aware as early as January 22 that protestors would be establishing a “War Room” in Ottawa.

The January 26 Project Hendon report contains the following passage:⁴

² OPP00001028 at p. 3.

³ OPP00001603 at p. 2.

⁴ OPP00001424 at PDF p. 5.



ASSESSMENT

Although convoy organizers have repeatedly stated the intention to conduct a lawful protest, the available information suggests that elements within the convoy, or supporting the convoy, could engage in actions that pose a public safety threat. Convoy organizers will almost certainly have minimal influence or control over the behaviour of these individuals. The noted video of the convoy in Manitoba depicts a level of disregard for other motorists, as well as behaviour by both convoy participants and supporters that poses a road safety issue. The fact that [REDACTED] is a suspended driver, yet is driving in the convoy, indicates a disregard for the law.

The potential presence of individuals who espouse fringe ideologies and have access to weapons in the convoy and at the protest in Ottawa could increase the threat level to public figures, property, the public, and law enforcement during this event. Disinformation and misinformation on the internet poses a potential threat to public figures and an officer safety threat. Erroneous or provocative comments online continue to fuel conspiracy theories with regard to the government's view of the convoy and could increase the level of any antagonism that some convoy participants and supporters may hold toward public officials and law enforcement. It is possible that further threats to police may be made. It is unknown whether any threat will escalate to action.

[REDACTED] call to stop talking publicly about forcing the Prime Minister to step down may be an attempt to gain plausible deniability in the event that the Prime Minister is harassed or threatened. It also indicates an awareness that public comments by convoy members or supporters may be monitored.

However, Project HENDON has not identified any concrete, specific, or credible threat with regard to the Freedom Convoy protest.

This passage listed many data points pointing to risks that could materialize, but such risks could materialize at most major events. This passage therefore did not assist Chief Sloy to determine whether the Freedom Convoy posed a major problem. The possibility that these risks could materialize would not require OPS to overhaul its operational plan, especially in light of the section's conclusion that "Project HENDON has not identified any concrete, specific, or credible threat with regard to the Freedom Convoy protest."⁵ OPS did have contingency plans for potential violence.

The January 28 Project Hendon report contains the following passage:⁶

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ OPP00000815 at PDF p. 7.



ASSESSMENT

The available information indicates that the protestors plan to remain in Ottawa at least until 2022-02-04. We continue to identify indicators to support at least some protestors remaining beyond the weekend of 2022-01-29/30. These indicators include collecting donations of cash, food, and water from supporters along the route.

The reason for the convoys transporting the noted pieces of heavy equipment is unknown and represents an intelligence gap.

Chief Sloly viewed the first sentence of the assessment (“The available information indicates that the protestors plan to remain in Ottawa at least until 2022-02-04”) as being qualified by the second sentence, which stated only that some “indicators support at least some protestors beyond the weekend of 2022-01-29/30.”⁷ Chief Sloly understood this to mean that the protest would primarily take place over one weekend, with a small group remaining after the weekend. This was consistent with the intelligence received to date. The examples provided in the third sentence, namely “donations of cash, food, and water from supporters along the route,”⁸ are present in many major protests.

The presence of heavy equipment at a protest involving trucks was not necessarily out of the ordinary. OPS had dealt with heavy equipment before, for example at protests involving tractors. Before the arrival of the Freedom Convoy, Chief Sloly had not received any intelligence from Deputy Chief Bell or other reports suggesting that convoy trucks would be weaponized and used as explosive devices. The first time Chief Sloly recalled hearing someone raise these concerns was during a phone call with the Acting Director of the Parliamentary Protective Service (**PPS**), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (**RCMP**) Superintendent Larry Brookson, on February 12 or 13.

Other Sources of Intelligence

On January 21, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson forwarded Chief Sloly an email chain that contained emails from Inspector Russell Lucas, Staff Sergeant Kevin Kennedy, and Sergeant Sean Kay.⁹ Sergeant Kay’s email stated that “[t]he goal of the convoy is to remain in Ottawa until the restrictions are repealed,” and mentioned that \$800,000 had been raised on GoFundMe to support the Freedom Convoy.¹⁰ Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson’s email to Chief Sloly stated that the Freedom Convoy “has been determined to be a larger event and ‘high risk’ for its potential to cause large traffic disruptions because of the volume of participants.”¹¹

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ OPS00002878.

¹⁰ *Id.* at PDF p. 4.

¹¹ *Id.* at PDF P. 1.



This email indicated to Chief Sloly that the Freedom Convoy would be more than a weekend event for some protestors. However, the email did not indicate to Chief Sloly that the Freedom Convoy would be a multi-week event or a national occupation. If Sergeant Kay had those concerns, Chief Sloly would have expected him to inform his immediate superiors who would have considered these concerns and made the requisite changes to the operational plan's concept of operations.

Chief Sloly understood Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's reference to "high risk" to mean, in relation to traffic impacts, that the Freedom Convoy was larger than a normal protest and that OPS might need to increase staffing. He did not understand her to mean that the Freedom Convoy would turn into a national security crisis.

Chief Sloly did not recall a meeting between OPS and the City to discuss information from the Ottawa Gatineau Hotel Association that protestors had booked a large number of rooms and that convoy leaders had a discussion with the association's president. He recalls having been informed of this but he assumed that Deputy Chief Bell would have received and reviewed this information and converted it into the ongoing intelligence TRA for inclusion in the operational plan.

On January 26 at 6:40 a.m., Chief Sloly forwarded to Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson an email from an Ottawa resident to Chief Sloly with the subject line "Safety of residents surrounding Rideau Hall this weekend – extreme right pledging violence."¹² Chief Sloly's email stated that the resident "is seeing online postings from what he calls extreme right wing elements calling for violence" at the Freedom Convoy.¹³ Chief Sloly's email also stated: "Please review all available info/intel/incidents and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment and the most appropriate operations plan for the event."¹⁴

Chief Sloly's view was that the latest situation update from the Intelligence Directorate did not indicate violent elements. Chief Sloly's intent in sharing this email was simply to question inconsistencies in what he was hearing. He was not questioning Deputy Chief Bell's overarching threat assessment. Chief Sloly wanted to ensure that intelligence was as good as it could be, that the TRA was as accurate as it could be, and that the operational plan was based on intelligence. Chief Sloly was concerned with the potential for violence, not the scale of the event and whether it would result in a prolonged occupation. Chief Sloly stated that the concern expressed stemmed from the fact that it is common for intelligence reporting not to have caught up with incoming information which changes very rapidly.

Understanding of Intelligence Concerning Protestors' Intent

Through intelligence reports and briefings from Deputy Chief Bell, Chief Sloly understood that the intent of Freedom Convoy participants expanded beyond their initial focus on the

¹² OPS00003073.

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Id.*



federal decision to require truckers to be vaccinated. As time progressed, several different convoys and competing and conflicting messages emerged, including messages to overthrow the government and repeal laws. He was aware of many conflicting assessments of convoy participants' intent in intelligence reports. He was not aware of any intelligence report nor does he recall receiving any intelligence briefing that said that, on balance, the convoys would occupy and blockade Ottawa, that the occupation would last for months, would involve thousands of trucks and protestors, and would be able to defeat OPS's capabilities. Such an intelligence TRA would have triggered a whole other level of discussions at OPS and other police services to prepare for and resource the police response to the Freedom Convoy events. He acknowledged that intelligence assessments are not always definitive as to the most likely occurrences but commented that he has seen intelligence assessments that were far more definitive than those he received in the lead-up to the Freedom Convoy related events.

Chief Sloly and the City both received updates from INTERSECT, a body created about 17 years ago to improve coordination and de-confliction between police and other agencies in the National Capital Region. He received a January 26 INTERSECT update that stated that the Freedom Convoy could go on for a prolonged period. He understood prolonged to mean multiple days.

Based on the intelligence reports and TRA assessments from Deputy Chief Bell he received, Chief Sloly was advised that convoy participants would arrive in Ottawa between Thursday, January 27 and Saturday, January 29, with the bulk of participants arriving on January 29. He understood that the convoy participants had planned events for the January 29-30 weekend. He was advised by Deputy Chief Bell that he expected that the vast majority of convoy participants would leave at the end of the weekend or shortly thereafter. Deputy Chief Bell advised that the OPS could expect that smaller groups might linger and occupy parts of Ottawa's downtown core, as had occurred during other major demonstrations in Ottawa. He was advised that OPS would be able to successfully negotiate a safe end to any occupations by smaller groups of convoy participants by using the measured approach principle.

Understanding of Fundraising

During the week of January 24, Chief Sloly knew that convoy participants had raised millions of dollars on the GoFundMe crowdfunding platform, but he was not aware of how the money would be used and to whom the funds were actually available. Chief Sloly does not recall being briefed on the relationship between the individuals who ran the GoFundMe page and the various convoy organizers. While he observed that the fundraising by protestors was significant, he explained that he did not receive an assessment of what the impact of the GoFundMe would be in advance.

Understanding of Scale of Event

By January 27, based on Deputy Chief Bell's intelligence TRA, the OPS was planning for a large number of convoy vehicles to attend Ottawa. He did not recall whether OPS



identified a specific number of vehicles that would be arriving. Chief Sloly was briefed that a large number of convoy participants would arrive in Ottawa on January 28-29, but that only a small number of protestors would remain beyond the January 29-30 weekend.

General Order on Staffing

On January 24, Chief Sloly was requested to issue a General Order that restricted discretionary time off to prepare for the Freedom Convoy's arrival.¹⁵ The General Order stated that "[w]hile the event has been scheduled for one day, it is highly likely that many participants will not leave the city for an undetermined amount of time."¹⁶ At the time, the intelligence reports on the Freedom Convoy were changing day by day, and he wanted to give members of the OPS advance notice that staffing might be affected. He characterized the excerpted statement as consistent with the briefings that he received from Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that most protestors would leave after the January 29-30 weekend but that some would remain since the order expired on February 1st. He indicated that the language of the excerpt was not meant to be exact.

Discussion of Intelligence at January 27 Meeting

During the interview, Chief Sloly was shown the following excerpt of the minutes of a January 27 truck convoy meeting that he and the OPS command team attended:¹⁷

- Chief questions:
 - o OPP Commissioner – some may be communication item
 - o Several questions around truck interdiction
 - o MTO examinations and some people get pulled off road
 - o Interdict tow truck equipment prior to it being used against us. Heavy equipment within convoy to take down barriers – a level of pre-planning we don't normally see. Concerned they have this for something that is supposed to be lawful.

Chief Sloly recalled that the presence of heavy machinery was a concerning data point to be interpreted in the context of a large data set. He understood from Deputy Chief Bell's briefings that the Freedom Convoy would be a major demonstration, and that some elements of the convoy might remain in Ottawa after the January 29-30 weekend.

Chief Sloly was also shown the following excerpt of the minutes during the interview:¹⁸

¹⁵ OPS00002916.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ OPS00014559 at PDF p. 1.

¹⁸ *Id.*



- Chief – planning for extended demo and digging in around parliament – plan a proper demobilization project. Do another risk assessment on Sunday evening. Before we send an officer home we need to do a clear demobilization assessment. There will then be a recovery phase. Ppl will be tired but we will be getting questions ... how much did this cost tax payers. SIU is prepositioning resources already. Media inquiries, compensation claims. If we can predict it we can start to prevent it. This will be a challenging operation.

Chief Sloly stated that it was good practice to plan for demobilization and recovery. He could not specifically recall using the phrase “digging in around parliament.” As of January 27, Deputy Chief Bell had not provided him with an intelligence assessment indicating that there would be an occupation or fortification that would go on for weeks.

January 28 Media Availability

On January 28, Chief Sloly, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, City General Manager for Emergency and Protective Services Kim Ayotte, and City Director for Traffic Services Phil Landry gave a media availability.¹⁹ During the media availability, the following exchange occurred between the Canadian Press and Chief Sloly:²⁰

Canadian Press: What do you plan to do if protesters stay for the weekend/week?

Chief Sloly:

- Fluid part of our operation, we do not have their exit strategy
- We're in daily comms with organizers
- We will be concerned if there are still large demonstrations come Monday, as there is increased traffic flow, infrastructure operations to consider
- We are prepared and capable to remove vehicles
- So far, good cooperation from core organizers and will do our best to continue that throughout the demonstration

Chief Sloly indicated that he was expecting a small group of protestors to stay after the January 29-30 weekend and that OPS had access to three heavy trucks capable of removing vehicles. He was not sure if the three heavy trucks were City vehicles or OPS-contracted vehicles. However, when the Freedom Convoy arrived, convoy participants did not respond to traditional methods of enforcement and crowd management.

¹⁹ OPS00004178.

²⁰ *Id.*



Pre-Arrival Planning

Development of Pre-Arrival Operational Plan

By January 28, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's planning team had prepared an operational plan titled "Freedom Convoy – Canada Unity," dated January 28, 2022 (**Pre-Arrival Operational Plan**).²¹ The Pre-Arrival Operational Plan was a traffic-focused plan.

Chief Sloly reviewed the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan on January 28 and asked questions about it to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. He had regularly reviewed operational plans from his time as an Incident Commander, Staff Superintendent, and Deputy Chief at TPS – especially around major events and/or ones with higher levels of TRA. His role was to ask questions, get clarification, and test the plan. However, it was not his role under OPS business processes to formally approve the plan, and he never directed Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, the Event Commander or the Incident Commander that he had to approve the operational plans before they could be implemented or actioned. He agreed with Deputy Chief Bell's overall intelligence, threat assessment along with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's operational planning, and mitigation contingencies contained in the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan.

Role of Inspector Lucas as Incident Commander

The Pre-Arrival Operational Plan identifies Inspector Russell Lucas as the Incident Commander.²² Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson appointed Inspector Lucas as the Incident Commander. Chief Sloly thought Inspector Lucas had the right experience and capability. He was one of OPS's most experienced inspectors, he had CIC training, and Chief Sloly had observed his work. He had also just been assigned to oversee OPS's Special Events team, which included ESU functions. Inspector Lucas reported to the MIC, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, and she provided him with strategic oversight.

The "Command and Control" section of the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan states that "[t]he Incident Commander holds overall responsibility and authority for this event and is responsible for its implementation."²³ Chief Sloly agreed that this description of the Incident Commander's role is consistent with his understanding of the ICS model. He agreed that the Incident Commander should have autonomy and should have authority to act quickly to respond to unfolding situations on the ground. He would not expect the Incident Commander to seek his approval on operational decisions.

The "Roles and Responsibilities" section of the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan contains the following statement:²⁴

²¹ OPP00004262.

²² *Id.* at PDF p. 3.

²³ *Id.* at PDF p. 31.

²⁴ *Id.* at PDF p. 19.



The OPS Incident Commander is responsible for the overall OPS security planning and operations for the event, with full authority to draw on resources, both human and material, to effectively accomplish these tasks.

Chief Sloly agreed that this statement is consistent with his understanding of the ICS model, subject to the caveat that the Incident Commander's authority is not unfettered. The Incident Commander is responsible for operations concerning an event but cannot unilaterally make decisions that affect other policing responsibilities.

Further below, the "Roles and Responsibilities" section of the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan contains the following statement:²⁵

Roles and Responsibilities

The Incident Commander shall:

- establish OPS objectives;
- identify resources as required;
- approve and review the OPS Freedom Convoy Operational plan;
- liaise with Branch Directors and Advisors, directing as required the activities of OPS units and support agencies assigned to the event;
- liaise with the RCMP, PPS, OPP, SQ and Gatineau Police Incident Commanders and other agencies;
- receive updates from the Operations Chief;
- make decisions considering the mission and objectives identified in the plan;
- request additional resources as required to address emerging issues;
- be responsible for final decisions involving issues concerning crowd management and public order in the area of operations;
- ensure and event log is maintained, and;
- participate in the post-event debrief.

Chief Sloly agreed that this passage accurately described the scope of the Incident Commander's authority.

Role of Superintendent Rheaume

The Pre-Arrival Operational Plan identifies Superintendent Chris Rheaume as an authorizing authority.²⁶ Superintendent Rheaume was responsible for reviewing and approving the plan that Inspector Lucas prepared because he oversaw Inspector Lucas's management of the Special Events team. Chief Sloly was not aware of any moment at which Superintendent Rheaume effectively oversaw operations related to the Freedom

²⁵ *Id.* at PDF p. 20.

²⁶ *Id.* at PDF p. 2.



Convoy events or at which he effectively exercised any supervisory role over Inspector Lucas.

Role of Chief Sloly

Chief Sloly understood that, as OPS Chief, he was accountable for everything. He delegated authorities down through the organizational chart including the MIC who oversaw the Incident Commander. If at any point an Incident Commander was acting in a problematic manner or was incapable of fulfilling the Incident Commander role, then a ranking officer, like Chief Sloly, had the option to insert themselves into the process by either assuming the Incident Commander role or reassigning that role to another person.

Role of OPS Command and Operations Centres

The “Roles and Responsibilities” section of the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan states that “[t]he Incident Commander will be situated at the NCRCC.”²⁷ This passage referred to the National Capital Region Command Centre (**NCRCC**), which served as the operational command centre for OPS’s response to the Freedom Convoy. The Incident Commander was based at NCRCC until Chief Sloly’s resignation. Representatives of other police services and agencies assisting OPS were also present at the NCRCC. The NCRCC was an integrated operational command system under OPS’s overarching command.

The “Command and Control” section of the plan discusses the role of the OPS Command Centre.²⁸ The OPS Command Centre was an operations centre for daily operations in Ottawa that supported the 911 dispatch system. It supported the Incident Commander and NCRCC, but was not the Command Centre for the Freedom Convoy. When NCRCC stood down during the nights, the OPS Command Centre was responsible for monitoring the city as a whole, including protest sites.

During the Freedom Convoy, Chief Sloly operated out of his office at 474 Elgin Street.

Chief Sloly emphasized that the OPS had only a single operational command centre for the Freedom Convoy, namely NCRCC. He was not aware of any concerns within OPS or from partner agencies that OPS was operating multiple command centres.

Allowing Freedom Convoy Vehicles to Enter Downtown Ottawa

Based on what it knew from intelligence reports and Deputy Chief Bell’s intelligence TRA, the OPS’ operational plan was for a weekend long demonstration involving heavy trucks and vehicles. The traffic portion of the plan would, through PLT negotiations, try to have the bulk of the trucks and vehicles staged in areas away from the downtown core while allowing the remaining trucks, vehicles and demonstrators to enter the downtown core, including Wellington St. The OPS had done this for similar protest events, including events with heavy trucks and vehicles. Chief Sloly was not aware of any plan that would

²⁷ *Id.* at PDF p. 19.

²⁸ *Id.* at PDF p. 32.



have had OPS fully block access to downtown Ottawa or to block vehicle access to Wellington St.

Chief Sloly was advised that based on the known intelligence reports, OPS did not have the legal authority to deny the Freedom Convoy access to downtown Ottawa simply because some people disagreed with the views of some participants. He understood that OPS did have authority to close roads and restrict traffic if there were public safety concerns, but closures and restrictions had to be commensurate to actual threats or reasonably predictable threats. *Highway Traffic Act* or by-law violations alone would not be sufficient to justify restricting access to the City for all protestors.

Threat Assessment

The Pre-Arrival Operational Plan contains Deputy Chief Bell's "Threat Assessment" section, which states that "[t]he Canadian Integrated Terror Assessment Centre (ITAC) indicates that the current threat level for Canada is medium."²⁹ The ITAC assessment was not specific to the Freedom Convoy and instead assessed the threat level across Canada. As a local police chief, Chief Sloly did not have an opinion as to whether the Freedom Convoy posed a medium-level national security risk. Before the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa, he never received any intelligence reports or briefings from Deputy Chief Bell that described the events around the Freedom Convoy as a national security threat.

By January 29, Chief Sloly understood the Freedom Convoy to be a high-risk, local public order event but he was not briefed by Deputy Chief Bell that it had the potential to be a national security crisis or that there was a risk of critical violence. Chief Sloly was briefed that the public order risk stemmed from the large crowd size and the presence of multiple vehicles. Chief Sloly considered similar risks that were posed by the 2000 truck protest, Occupy Toronto, demonstrations at the Serbian Embassy, and protests against the Sri Lankan Civil War. Chief Sloly felt that the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan was consistent with the risk assessment that the Intelligence Directorate had developed at the time. There were lots of large vehicles and protestors, energy, and pre-planning, and the event was fluid and characterized by pent-up frustrations.

Pre-Arrival Discussions with Partners

Role of OPSB

OPSB has three principal oversight functions. First, it sets strategic priorities for OPS by consulting with the public and the OPS Chief. Second, it manages the OPS chief and executive officers through human resources functions and annual evaluations of performance and discipline and conduct-related issues. Third, it ensures that OPS has the necessary resources to deliver adequate and effective policing. OPSB oversees the OPS Chief through the first two functions by setting strategic priorities for the Chief to

²⁹ *Id.* at PDF p. 6.



operationalize, holding the Chief accountable for successfully accomplishing those priorities, and addressing the Chief's performance through feedback.

OPSB has multiple tools at its disposal to conduct oversight. OPSB can discharge its management and human resources function through annual reviews, bonuses, and sanctions. It can also request information, seek clarification, and engage in discussions to gain clarity about the Chief's performance. It can discharge these responsibilities through regularly scheduled board meetings, special board meetings, and meetings of board committees.

OPSB's oversight authority is not limitless. OPSB cannot direct the Chief concerning specific police operations and activities. The Board can assess the performance of the Police Chief in meeting the strategic objectives it has set, but it has not been his experience that a Board assesses performance based on specific operations. Chief Sloly is familiar with the June 2012 Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit by the Honourable John W. Morden (**Morden Report**).³⁰ He expects that OPSB reviewing a chief's handling of a specific police operation as part of a performance review would overstep its role under the Morden Report.

Briefings of OPSB & Discussions with Ms. Deans

On January 25 at 8:49 p.m., Chief Sloly sent an email to OPS Executive Director of Strategy & Communications John Steinbachs with several comments and proposed changes to an update to the OPSB, along with a series of questions about OPS's response to the Freedom Convoy. One of those questions was: "How will we sustain the ICS operation over the full period of the demo (24-72 hours)?"³¹ Chief Sloly wanted to ensure that a full ICS team would be available for the core demonstration. At the time, OPS was planning for the core demonstration to occur over a 72-hour period, and for a small group of protestors to remain after that period.

On January 26, Chief Sloly and the OPS command team briefed OPSB on the Freedom Convoy. Chief Sloly and the OPS command team provided a high-level summary of OPS's operational plan that outlined the framework of the plan. Chief Sloly indicated that he shared a level of detail that he understood was consistent with the framework set out in the Morden Report.³²

Chief Sloly and the OPS command team also provided a high-level summary of intelligence to OPSB. The summary of the intelligence communicated that OPS expected that the core demonstration would occur over a 72-hour period, and that a small group of protestors would remain after that period. Chief Sloly could not have shared Project Hendon reports with OPSB because those reports were the property of OPP, not OPS. OPS provided summary overviews of intelligence in public and in camera OPSB

³⁰ See COM00000616.

³¹ OPS00003051.

³² COM00000616.



meetings, as well as to smaller groups of OPSB members. OPS shared as much intelligence with OPSB as appropriate.

Chief Sloly also kept OPSB updated outside of the January 26 OPSB meeting. He communicated with OPSB via informal calls and regular emails.

Chief Sloly recalled that, before the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa, Ms. Deans told him that she was concerned that convoy participants would remain in Ottawa beyond the January 29-30 weekend. Chief Sloly asked her if she had information to substantiate that concern that OPS could consider and indicated that he would be surprised if the bulk of the demonstration proceeded into Monday the 31st. He told Ms. Deans that OPS had successfully resolved similar protests, including the summer 2020 Black Lives Matter march and a fall 2020 protest after an OPS officer was acquitted of criminal charges in connection with the death of Abdirahman Abdi. During the interview, he indicated that, at the time, Deputy Chief Bell's intelligence TRA indicated that the Freedom Convoy would be a three-day event and that most convoy activity would end on Sunday, January 30.

[Coordination with the City](#)

OPS began coordinating with the City on planning through INTERSECT before the Freedom Convoy arrived. Chief Sloly expects that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson reached out to Mr. Kanellakos or other senior City staff to loop the City into the planning process. By the week of January 24, Chief Sloly participated in daily calls with Mayor Jim Watson, Ms. Deans, and Mr. Kanellakos to provide updates, and answer questions. He also met personally with the downtown Ottawa business improvement area and four downtown city councillors. The City provided OPS with the resources it requested to Chief Sloly's knowledge.

Chief Sloly understood that the City saw OPS as the lead agency to respond to the Freedom Convoy. OPS played a leadership role by briefing the City and sharing information about intelligence and operational planning. OPS's messaging was consistent, regular, high-quality, and high-quantity.

Chief Sloly's understanding was that OPS could not direct the City and the City could not direct OPS. He described this during the interview as a separation of church and state.

[Coordination with Other Police Agencies](#)

Chief Sloly had multiple conversations with leaders of other police agencies, including RCMP and OPP, about OPS's plans before the Freedom Convoy's arrival. OPS also shared information about its plans with police partners through INTERSECT. Chief Sloly believes that OPP and RCMP did their best to assist OPS to prepare for the Freedom Convoy.

Chief Sloly never received any written or verbal communications from Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, the Incident Commander or from OPP, RCMP, or other partner agencies suggesting that OPS's plan to allow the Freedom Convoy to enter



downtown Ottawa was wrongheaded or contrary to partners' expectations. Specifically, he did not recall that PPS expressed any concerns to OPS about allowing the Freedom Convoy to enter downtown Ottawa before the Freedom Convoy arrived. He only learned that PPS had concerns after the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa.

Prior to the Convoys' arrival, the OPP published a situational report stating that the OPS's Pre-Arrival Operational Plan was robust and fit for purpose. No one told Chief Sloly that the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan was not aligned with Deputy Chief Bell's intelligence TRA.

Chief Sloly commented that the Freedom Convoy events exposed structural deficits, resource deficits, and an excessive focus on Islamist extremism at the expense of other threats in Canada's national security. The fact that OPP's Project Hendon was playing such a significant role on national security threat assessments was an indication of the structural deficits because a national security agency should have filled this intelligence role. But the OPP had to fill this gap as a provincial police service because apparently no national security agency was doing so. RCMP faces seven-to-eight mandates and has insufficient resources to meet those mandates, and RCMP's decisions about how to allocate scarce resources will inevitably result in structural gaps. CSIS also faces resource challenges that result in structural gaps, as do most municipal police agencies like the OPS.

First Weekend and Week One (January 28-February 6): Paradigm Shift and OPS Initial Response to the Freedom Convoy

The January 29-30 Weekend & the Paradigm Shift

Chief Sloly stated that the OPS's understanding of the Freedom Convoy shifted between Saturday, January 29 and Tuesday, February 1. His understanding of this shift grew based on his conversations with partner agencies, speaking with OPS officers, touring the protest site, and becoming familiar with the blockade that was established at Coutts, Alberta on January 29. On February 1st, an experienced Canadian Armed Forces officer told Chief Sloly that the Freedom Convoy had elements of an insurgency.

On January 29 at 10:45 a.m., Chief Sloly visited the protest site on Wellington St. During his visit, he started to realize that the Freedom Convoy was different from what OPS had expected and was an unprecedented event. He started to think that the Freedom Convoy could rise to a national-level threat, though he did not have enough information to determine this. Later, on January 29, Inspector Lucas decided to prevent further access into the downtown Ottawa protest site, which Chief Sloly termed the "Red Zone."

During a January 30 afternoon briefing by Deputy Chief Bell, Chief Sloly determined that the occupation element of the Freedom Convoy would go beyond what OPS expected. Before that time, Chief Sloly had been briefed by Deputy Chief Bell that the Freedom Convoy would contain some small element of an occupation, but that it would be similar to protests that OPS had responded to in the past. Chief Sloly understands an "occupation" in the context of Canadian policing to refer to a group of people who have



established a capability to stay for multiple days in a given location and intend to stay in that location for a particular or undetermined period of time until they choose to leave or are removed by an intervention.

Chief Sloly did not recall speaking with City lawyer David White on January 30 concerning obtaining an injunction. Prior to the arrival of the demonstrations, he was considering whether an injunction should be sought at that time but was not sure if it was a high priority. If pursued and obtained, an injunction could have assisted with a number of issues that OPS was facing, including violations of noise and parking by-laws, but it would not have been a silver bullet. OPS did not have the resources to effectively enforce an injunction and so was actively seeking significantly more resources from external police agencies.

On February 1 at 3:00 p.m., Chief Sloly met with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, Inspector Marin, ESU Commander Mike Stoll and the POU commanders from other jurisdictions at the hotel in Kanata they were staying at.³³ Inspector Lucas did not attend due to the distance, but representatives from his ICS did. Chief Sloly invited two PLT supervisors to this meeting to ensure that PLT was aware of the POU planning. Chief Sloly attended the meeting to communicate to ESU Commander Stoll and the other POU commanders that OPS needed a public order plan to clear the Red Zone and safely end the events in Ottawa, and that POU commanders should think about what resources they needed to accomplish that plan. The POU commanders told Chief Sloly that such a plan would likely need every POU in Ontario and more from across Canada to retake the Red Zone. Chief Sloly realized in this moment that the demonstration was a paradigm shifting event which required a country wide response which went beyond traditional policing methods.

From the first weekend of the demonstration, OPS became aware of increasing levels of threatening and anti-social behaviour by convoy participants. OPS conducted enforcement actions such as *Criminal Code* investigations, tagging and towing, and ticketing for by-law violations to attempt to control this behaviour, especially in the residential and business areas immediately around the red zone. Chief Sloly viewed these actions as necessary, although not sufficient to resolve the Freedom Convoy situation.

February 2 Absence of a Policing Solution Statement

On February 2 at 1:30 p.m., Chief Sloly spoke with Mayor Watson.³⁴ Chief Sloly's notes of this meeting read as follows:³⁵

"Advised that all options on the table needs to consider the 'political option' – what role(s) can Premiere [sic] and PM play in diffusing the demonstration. It is not my legal responsibility to end a demonstration – it is my legal responsibility to provide adequate and effective policing/to serve and protect the city/citizens."

³³ OPS00014484 at PDF p. 1.

³⁴ *Id.* at PDF p. 22.

³⁵ *Id.*



Chief Sloly recalled making this statement to Mayor Watson. He explained during the interview that the Ontario *Police Services Act* obligates him as OPS Chief to maintain order and provide adequate and effective policing within his legal authority, consistent with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and with the resources available, but that the Act does not require him to end demonstrations. Chief Sloly told Mayor Watson that he was going to do his job and use every resource that he possibly had to try and restore safety, but that it was not his job to end the entirety of the demonstration.

Chief Sloly indicated that the “options” he was envisioning referred to the need for additional resources and engagement by civil society, including the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government, to help resolve the Freedom Convoy related demonstrations locally and nationally. He needed negotiation efforts as part of this solution. The context for his call with Mayor Watson was Chief Sloly’s February 1 meeting with POU commanders where they told him that they needed every POU in Ontario as well as POUs from elsewhere in Canada to resolve the Freedom Convoy. Chief Sloly lacked the power to unilaterally secure these resources.

Chief Sloly recalled stating during an OPSB meeting on February 2 that there may not be a policing solution to the Freedom Convoy. He intended this statement to be a call for civil society and the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government to think more broadly about ways to resolve the Freedom Convoy and assist in resolving it. He meant that the OPS did not have the capacity or resources to bring an end to these events by itself. As he had indicated in a meeting with Mayor Watson, the OPS would continue to do all that it could and use of its resources to resolve the events but the OPS would need additional assistance from broader civil society. It was unfortunate that people perceived his statement as indicating that OPS was not doing anything or was giving up. This was never the case. The OPS was in fact using all available resources and doing everything possible to ensure public safety. Chief Sloly now understands that his comment was misunderstood and misrepresented in many ways. Some believed that he was calling for the assistance of the Canadian Armed Forces, which he was not.

Chief Sloly never heard that Mayor Watson, Ms. Deans, Mr. Kanellakos, or OPP were concerned about his February 2 statement and he had regular communications with both of them. He spoke with Commissioner Carrique about a Queen’s Park protest that Freedom Convoy participants had announced shortly after making the statement, and Commissioner Carrique raised no concerns. Commissioner Carrique agreed with Chief Sloly’s assessment that the still unfolding local, provincial and national events were beyond the ability of any one police service to handle. He and Commissioner Carrique agreed that Freedom Convoy participants were effectively dividing and conquering police services and spreading police resources thin by staging multiple events across the province and the country (i.e. protests in Queen’s Park and Quebec City that drew resources away from Ottawa).

Chief Sloly continues to believe that there was not a policing solution alone to the Freedom Convoy. Resolving the Freedom Convoy was a “whole of Canada effort” that involved private injunctions, multiple emergency declarations, attempted negotiations by



all levels of government. In the end, it required an unprecedented level of integration in the OPS plan to secure 2,000 officers from across Canada to Ottawa. The officers were able to leverage portions of the various injunctions and emergency declarations to execute the OPS plan and safely and successfully end an unforeseen and unprecedented national security crisis. He considers it a measure of success from a public safety perspective that this unprecedented national security crisis was resolved without riots, injury, or death. That said Chief Sloly acknowledges the significant trauma and victimization that local Ottawa residents, service providers, city workers and businesses experienced.

February 2 Conversations with Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General

The Ontario Provincial Government was mostly supportive of OPS. Chief Sloly spoke with Mr. Di Tommaso on February 2 at 12:00 p.m.³⁶ Mr. Di Tommaso was looking for verification on a report that ambulances were being denied access to Ottawa hospitals, and Chief Sloly informed him that the report was unfounded. Chief Sloly asked Mr. Di Tommaso if he was aware of the public safety implications that the Freedom Convoy situation in Ottawa posed to the rest of Ontario and requested a call with the Solicitor General, Sylvia Jones. Mr. Di Tommaso arranged that call, which took place later on February 2.

Chief Sloly does not think that his personal history with Mr. Di Tommaso or any other federal or provincial representatives directly affected how events during the Freedom Convoy unfolded. He stated that he had worked with Mr. Di Tommaso for most of his 27 years at TPS and that, when he was TPS Deputy Chief, he supported Mr. Di Tommaso promotion to superintendent and staff superintendent.

February 3 Public Order Meeting

On February 3 at 1:00 p.m., Chief Sloly met with Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.³⁷ Chief Sloly's notes record that he made the following statement: "I advised that I cannot approve a recommended course of action without being briefed on all other reasonable courses of action – further that all options have to be properly assessed."³⁸ Chief Sloly indicated that the context for this meeting was the February 1 meeting with POU commanders where Chief Sloly communicated that OPS needed a plan to reduce the Red Zone and that POU commanders should think about everything they needed. By February 3, two days had passed since that the February 1 meeting and there had been two failed attempts to provide Chief Sloly with a briefing. Chief Sloly was attempting to determine why OPS had been unable to complete a briefing on something so critically important and was concerned that some within OPS were revisiting what was agreed on at the February 1 meeting.

³⁶ OPS00014484 at PDF p. 21.

³⁷ OPS00014484 at pp. 3-4.

³⁸ *Id.* at PDF pp. 3-4.



Chief Sloly indicated that he needed to understand the proposed public order course of action in principle because it would be a large-scale operation that would require him to obtain unprecedented levels of resources from other police agencies. If he was going to be calling other police chiefs to request resources and justifying his requests to OPSB and the Ministry of the Solicitor General, he needed to make sure that he agreed on the model. The Incident Commander could not demand or make a resource request of the size that Chief Sloly was anticipating, and he considered approving the external resource request to be an executive -level responsibility.

Chief Sloly's notes of the February 3 at 1:00 p.m. meeting also record the following statement:³⁹

"I summarized the mission as ending the demonstration in as safe, ethical lawful manner as possible using all reasonable options."

By this time, Chief Sloly perceived that the Freedom Convoy was part demonstration, in large part an occupation, and also had elements of a national insurgency. OPS needed to play its role in addressing the events related to the Freedom Convoy locally. He perceived an urgency to take more clear and assertive action but wanted to ensure that any actions would be ethical, safe, lawful, and consistent with the *Charter* and the measured approach principle. He did not view his mission narrowly in terms of law enforcement, as law enforcement is only one of police's many responsibilities under the *Police Services Act* and it is irresponsible to simply enforce the law without taking broader concerns into account.

Provision of Information to OPSB

Chief Sloly attended all OPSB meetings, including in camera meetings, that were held during the Freedom Convoy while he was serving as chief. OPSB members must keep matters discussed during in camera sessions confidential, but he was aware of at least one occasion where a police services board member had failed to do so.

Chief Sloly recalled conversations with Ms. Deans in which she asked for OPS's plan. He told her that OPS was constantly evolving its operations plan based on a range of factors that included new intelligence, updated TRA's and available resources. His intent was to communicate that OPS was developing the sub-plans required to support the overall operational plan. The OPS operations plan was evolving, evergreen and included a mission, objectives, and principles that together constituted a framework of operations. Chief Sloly recalled that Ms. Deans, other OPSB members, City councillors, and the federal and provincial governments wanted detailed information about the plan and exact timelines for when the Freedom Convoy situation would end. However, the timeline to execute the plan depended on when OPS received the resources required, so OPS could not set out a detailed go-forward timeline with a definitive end-date.

³⁹ *Id.* at PDF pp. 3-4.



Chief Sloly shared high-level summaries of OPS's plan with OPSB on several occasions and proposed shifting OPSB meetings to in camera so that he could provide more details. He provided the substantial framework of the operational plan, consistent with his understanding of the Morden Report. However, it would defeat the purpose of having a plan to communicate it in full to the OPSB, the City Council, other levels of government and the general public. Chief Sloly was unaware of any instances in which a police force shared an entire operational plan with an oversight body. The Morden Report does not contemplate providing the details of the operational plan to the police board or another oversight body, and the Ontario *Police Services Act* does not require him to do so. Providing tactical-level details of the operational plan or the sub-plans supporting the operational plan, such as the POU and PLT plans, would be unnecessary for OPSB to discharge its oversight function and would pose information security risks. It would also risk involving OPSB in directing operations, which would overstep its role under the *Police Services Act* and the Morden Report.

Cooperation with the City on Road Closures, Towing, and By-law Enforcement

As the Freedom Convoy continued, OPS regularly revisited whether to restrict and block access to parts of downtown Ottawa. OPS also increasingly restricted and blocked access to the Red Zone and areas of the downtown core. The City and, later, the federal government helped supply barriers to OPS. The City Manager, Steve Kanellakos, never raised concerns with Chief Sloly about a lack of barriers. OPS never blocked access to the entire downtown core.

Road closures in and around the red zone required significant police resources to implement. Most road closures required two officers and one police cruiser to be present at all times, which took three-to-six officers out of circulation over a 24-hour period. For example, closing 10 roads would require 30-60 officers over a 24-hour period. OPS did not have enough officers to maintain the closure a significant number of roads.

OPS and the City's by-law department worked together on towing vehicles during the Freedom Convoy, but OPS may have towed vehicles independently of the City. OPS and/or the City did tow vehicles on January 29, but Chief Sloly could not recall if these were trucks or passenger vehicles.

Chief Sloly stated that he believed that by-law was acting effectively as a partner of the OPS during the occupation, attending ICS briefings and receiving directions/coordination from the ICS. He recalls that OPS indicated to by-law that enforcement posed an officer/public safety risk, but he is not aware of whether the Incident Commander ever instructed by-law not to issue tickets or to refrain from enforcement.

Chief Sloly was aware that when residents called the City of Ottawa Client Service Centres to request by-law enforcement, their calls were redirected to NCRCC. He characterized this as an example of integration between the City and OPS.



Efforts at Integration and Initial Requests for RCMP and OPP Assistance

Fully integrated, multi-agency ICS or CIC command structures have rarely been implemented and there is limited knowledge and expertise on their operation. Chief Sloly indicated that the best time to start elevating the level of integration depended on the clarity and certainty of the intelligence, the predictability of the threat assessment, and the necessity to ensure police operational capability. Specifically, the level of integration should be elevated when it becomes clear from an intelligence led TRA that an event is beyond the capacity of the local police of jurisdiction. The OPS engaged INTERSECT at the onset of the pre-planning/intelligence led TRA and then escalated the levels of integration throughout the event.

Chief Sloly was first asked by the MIC to request the assistance of municipal policing partners on January 27th. During the week of January 31, the MIC again asked Chief Sloly to request additional assistance from other municipal police agencies, the OPP and RCMP. His intent was to reach out to OPP and RCMP at the same time. He did not reach out to OPP first and use RCMP as a last resort. He is not aware of any discussions in which OPS asked RCMP to assist on the basis that the Freedom Convoy was a RCMP responsibility because convoy participants were protesting against a federal mandate.

Chief Sloly was not aware if OPP turned around officers en route to Ottawa because they lacked assignments or accommodations. He expects that if OPP had any concerns about assignments and accommodations for its officers, OPP would have raised those concerns with the Incident Commander.

Changing Incident Commanders

On February 2 at 4:38 p.m., Chief Sloly received an email from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's executive assistant that contained the notes from a 11:00 a.m. command briefing that morning.⁴⁰ The email contained the following bullet:⁴¹

"Chief had a productive meeting with POUs yesterday – working on intel, investigations, legal, communications, PLT supports – list what they want; concern that it remain under Russ Lucas; A/DC Ferguson to follow up;"

Chief Sloly indicated that he wanted to ensure that POU operations remained under Inspector Lucas's direction, consistent with the ICS model. Shortly thereafter, Chief Sloly was advised that Superintendent Dunlop had been appointed "Event Commander."

On February 5, Chief Sloly learned that Superintendent Jamie Dunlop had assumed control of the incident command functions as Event Commander and that Inspector Lucas was no longer exercising the functions originally assigned to the Incident Commander. Chief Sloly became aware that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson decided to appoint Superintendent Dunlop on Deputy Chief Bell's recommendation. On February 5, Chief

⁴⁰ OPS00005633.

⁴¹ *Id.*



Sloly told Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that he questioned the decision to assign Superintendent Dunlop these responsibilities and that he lacked confidence in Superintendent Dunlop because of his role in the unsuccessful October 2021 Panda Bowl public order event. Chief Sloly wanted Superintendent Dunlop to return to his role overseeing intelligence and investigations. He asked Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to recommend another Event Commander. He also told her and Deputy Chief Bell that, going forward, he needed to be made aware of any staffing changes at this level.

Following her conversation with Chief Sloly, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson recommended appointing Superintendent Mark Patterson as Event Commander. Chief Sloly had confidence in Superintendent Patterson and supported her recommendation. Superintendent Patterson began serving as Event Commander on February 5-6 and served in that role until February 10. Chief Sloly described Superintendent Patterson as confident and very goal oriented. On February 10, Acting Superintendent Bernier replaced Superintendent Patterson as Event Commander, and the circumstances of this change in Event Commander are discussed further below in this summary.

Chief Sloly acknowledged that switching Event Commanders was sub-optimal and that a natural by-product of that could affect coordination, deconfliction and communication. He was aware of concerns about switching Event Commanders. He indicated during the interview that any changes of the Event Commander should be well-communicated, defensible, and actionable.

Roles of Navigator and ASI

OPS and OPSB had engaged Navigator Ltd. (**Navigator**) to perform communications and issues management in connection with OPS's change management projects before the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa. During the January 29-30 weekend, Chief Sloly told Ms. Deans that OPS and OPSB needed communications and issues management help in connection with the Freedom Convoy, and at an emergency meeting, OPSB approved engaging Navigator to perform those tasks. Mr. Steinbachs needed Navigator's support because there were vacancies below him in OPS's corporate communications unit. After the Freedom Convoy arrived, Navigator provided communications and issues management support, wrote media releases, assisted in developing a social media strategy, and assisted Chief Sloly and Ms. Deans on how to manage issues in OPSB meetings.

OPS and OPSB had engaged Advanced Symbolics Inc. (**ASI**) in 2021 to help OPSB understand Ottawa community members' interests in OPS service delivery and priorities. Chief Sloly became familiar with ASI while working at Deloitte. ASI had the capacity to perform sampling of large amounts of people in specific geographic areas on very specific, nuanced issues, and was skilled at predicting public opinion. After the January 29-30 weekend, Chief Sloly asked Ms. Deans to approve ASI's assistance during the Freedom Convoy, and she agreed.



Neither Navigator nor ASI were engaged to perform Freedom Convoy-related tasks before the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa. Chief Sloly did not use either of them to attempt to predict or prevent protestor behaviour, as this was not part of the contracts for either ASI or Navigator. He also did not use Navigator or ASI to model negotiations, as this was not in their contract and would be inappropriate. To his knowledge, operational decisions were not based on Navigator or ASI assessments. ASI information was shared with the command team to provide situational awareness. If Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson had concerns about OPS's use of Navigator or ASI, he would have expected her to inform him of those concerns.

On February 3, ASI CEO Erin Kelly emailed Mr. Steinbachs and copied Chief Sloly on an email titled "Alberta effect."⁴² The email stated: "We ran the scenario the Chief asked 'What if we were to take further action and what happened in Alberta were to happen in Ottawa?'"⁴³ Chief Sloly recalled that "what happened in Alberta" referred to the RCMP-led operation in Coutts to remove 20-30 trucks that were blockading a highway, an operation which was immediately resisted, failed to accomplish its goals, and created public safety and officer safety risks. He asked ASI to run the scenario because on February 1 he had met with POU commanders and asked them to prepare options for a public order operation to take back significant segments of the protest sites in the downtown core. He felt that the Freedom Convoy had elements of a national movement and that there were protests and blockades occurring or soon to occur elsewhere in Ontario and Canada, and he wanted to understand what was happening in different jurisdictions. He did not rely on the information ASI provided to make policing decisions.

February 4-5: Closure of Bridges and Off-Ramps

On February 4, Chief Sloly announced at a press conference that OPS would be making greater use of road closures, including closures of off-ramps for Highway 417 and other 400-series highways. He did not recall stating that there would be closures of all bridges and off-ramps but does recall that the OPS wanted to increase its use of road closures to control the flow of demonstrators into the core.

On February 5 at 10:52 a.m., Staff Sergeant Denis Hull sent an email under Chief Sloly's signature block to OPP, RCMP, Sûreté du Québec (**SQ**), and Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau (**SPVG**) representatives. Staff Sergeant Hull requested OPP's assistance with Highway 416 and 417 off-ramp closures, and asked SQ, SPVG, and RCMP to assist with bridge closures, bridge monitoring, and diverting traffic.⁴⁴ Chief Sloly was not copied on the email. He did not authorize Staff Sergeant Hull to use his signature block to make this request. Chief Sloly did not make the request that was set out in the email.

⁴² OPS00005910

⁴³ OPS00005910.

⁴⁴ OPS00006957.



February 5 Morning Meetings & PLT Role in Clearing Confederation Park

Inspector Francois D'Aoust sent Chief Sloly a situation report over the night of February 4-5 that outlined what appeared to be an escalation of potential or actual violence. Specifically, protestors were expanding the zone they occupied and piling up propane, City workers were being attacked for installing barriers, Algonquin elders had failed to negotiate with protestors to leave Confederation Park and had to be rescued before they were attacked, and an OPS sergeant was swarmed at the intersection of Kent Street and Queen Street.

Chief Sloly saw the situation report early on the morning of February 5. In response, he held several early morning meetings to ensure that OPS's surge and enforcement strategy and efforts to harden the downtown core were proceeding properly. He wanted to ensure that OPS had the staffing to implement what it had announced on February 4. Specifically, he sent Inspector D'Aoust an email with a list of meeting topics and asked him to organize a meeting with the members of the IC and the command team. Inspector D'Aoust then cut and pasted the list of meeting topics into an email invitation to the OPS command team for a "Critical Incident Command Briefing" to occur at 9:00 a.m. that morning.⁴⁵ The meeting invitation was sent out under Chief Sloly's signature line and contained text under the headings "Situational Awareness," "General Priorities," and "Location Priorities," "Planning & Logistics," and "Intelligence & Investigations."⁴⁶

Chief Sloly did not consider himself to be engaged in planning a police operation when he called the February 5 9:00 a.m. briefing. Rather, he considered himself to be briefing the OPS command team on the level of violence and ensuring that OPS had the ability and resources to carry out its stated operational objectives that had been publicly announced on February 4. The Event Commander would be responsible for planning and implementing the operation.

Inspector D'Aoust's email did not mention PLT. Chief Sloly understood PLT to be playing the same role that it had from the start of the Freedom Convoy, and that PLT's role had not been changed or eliminated.

The email contained the following statement under the "Location Priorities" heading:

"1. Confederation Park encampment – negotiations with Algonquin elders failed, they attacked elders and we now have no other options except to isolate, contain and remove the encampment."

By the morning of February 5, Chief Sloly had been receiving briefings about Confederation Park for 48-to-72 hours. OPS had tried every option to convince protestors to leave the park, including PLT engagement over several days and bringing in Algonquin elders, but Chief Sloly was advised that the elders had been disrespected and almost attacked. During the interview, Chief Sloly indicated that the OPS needs to realize when

⁴⁵ OPS00006812.

⁴⁶ *Id.*



negotiations cannot work and when police need consider other options including POU to address the situation. But he never directed PLT to cease engaging with protestors at Confederation Park.

Ultimately, the Confederation Park protestors agreed to leave the park. Chief Sloly heard that the protestors voted to eject their more aggressive members and accepted the PLT's deal to clear the park, and that PLT convinced protestors to leave the park. The Event Commander would have overseen the details of PLT's engagement and the clearing of the park.

Chief Sloly understood that Dr. Peter Collins was providing higher-level advice to OPS PLT and that he had seen Dr. Collins engage with OPS PLT. He does not know whether Dr. Collins provided assistance with Confederation Park specifically. It was Chief Sloly's understanding that Dr. Collins was on a long-term retainer contract with OPP and had arrived in Ottawa as part of the resources that the OPP provided. Chief Sloly knew that Dr. Collins was assisting the ICS but was not aware of his day to day activities in Ottawa.

February 5 Conversation with Commissioner Carrique

On February 5, Commissioner Carrique called Chief Sloly and cautioned him about relying too heavily on Dr. Collins, Commissioner Carrique recommended someone else within OPP who could also advise Chief Sloly on PLT, and Chief Sloly sought advice from that person on one occasion.

During the conversation, Commissioner Carrique advised that he was hearing concerns from his officers about the functioning of the PLT within the OPS ICS. Chief Sloly confirmed that the OPS had a good PLT which was well-suited to regular policing, but he agreed with Commissioner Carrique that the Freedom Convoy was very challenging and that OPS was trying to effectively manage a range of ICS issues including the PLT function. Chief Sloly welcomed OPP assistance and advice including PLT specific supports. OPP Inspector Marcel Beaudin arrived in Ottawa and began assisting with PLT work around this time.

Commissioner Carrique also informed Chief Sloly that he was hearing concerns about the changes in the ICS. Chief Sloly thanked him and informed him that he was aware of it. February 5 was the day Chief Sloly realized that Superintendent Dunlop taken over Incident Command functions and Chief Sloly attributed some of the issues to the scale and complexity of the Convoy events as well as the ICS leadership changes that week.

February 5 OPSB Meeting

On February 5, Ms. Deans asked Chief Sloly during a public OPSB meeting to provide a document with specific numbers of officers that OPS needed to provide adequate and effective policing in Ottawa. OPSB was engaged in a significant effort to muster resources and wanted to work with Mayor Watson and the City to champion resource requests. Ms. Deans chose to make her request during the public session, rather than an in-camera session.



February 6 Coventry Road Operation & PLT Concerns

Chief Sloly was aware that a significant operation would be taking place at Coventry Road on February 6. He left the details and planning of this operation to the Event Commander. He wanted to be briefed on whether the operation was successful.

Chief Sloly was aware of concerns that the PLT was not always optimally integrated in the ICS. PLT members did express concern to him that it was not involved in planning and was not in the loop of operations. He appreciated these concerns, tried to assist in resolving them but characterized these concerns as understandable in an unprecedented, long, and difficult multi-day event. Some of the efforts that Chief Sloly made to support and improve the PLT's effectiveness was his visit to the PLT command centre to meet with the PLT members and his inclusion of the PLT supervisors at the POU meeting on Feb 1.

February 6 Evening Meeting

By February 6, Chief Sloly was receiving briefings from the ICS about their concerns about the group of protestors at the intersection of Rideau Street and Sussex Drive. The intelligence he received from the ICS briefings indicated that this group was the most volatile protestor group and was linked with criminal associations and organized crime. It was also engaged in unlawful activities that broke by-laws and contributed to community trauma.

Chief Sloly participated in a command meeting on the evening of February 6 with OPS senior officers and certain OPP members. He did not recall which OPP members were present. At this meeting, Superintendent Patterson identified clearing the Rideau-Sussex red zone intersection as his main priority. Superintendent Patterson told Chief Sloly that it would take time to clear the Rideau-Sussex intersection. Chief Sloly had no role in planning the Rideau-Sussex operation, as that was Superintendent Patterson's ICS responsibility. He never directed that the PLT should not be engaged in the Rideau-Sussex operation. He indicated during the interview that the PLT should be engaged whether police are dealing with good actors or bad actors.

During the meeting, Chief Sloly discussed obtaining additional resources with his officers. The context for the discussion was the OPSB request for a list of resources that the OPS needed to successfully end the events in Ottawa. Chief Sloly referenced that on February 1 his POU commanders told him that the OPS would need every POU in Ontario and others from elsewhere in Canada to clear the Red Zone so there was clearly a need for an exponential level of extra resources. Chair Deans had asked him to provide the total number of officers OPS needed to end the occupation as soon as possible. He asked his command team and ICS team to identify how many additional resources were needed in a detailed report. From his perspective, Ms. Deans' request for a total number was OPS's last best chance to ask for everything it needed to safely, successfully, and sustainably resolve the Freedom Convoy events in Ottawa.



Chief Sloly does not have an independent recollection of having told his officers to consider how many officers they needed and then double it but recognizes that he may have said something of this nature. To the extent that he made such a comment, it would have been his way of encouraging exponential as opposed to incremental thinking similar to the POU resource assessment that he had received on February 1. It was a turn of phrase that was not meant to be taken literally. Chief Sloly's point was that if officers thought they needed 200 officers but were unsure if that would be enough in the long-term, then they should ask for more than 200 officers. He told them to consider their short-term, medium-term, and long-term needs, and to consider how many officers would be required for other ICS related tasks in addition to clearing the Red Zone.

At the time of the February 6 evening meeting, the OPS had its operations plan along with a range of sub-plans in constant development depending on the daily circumstances and priorities. The operations plan was always evolving as has been described earlier. The plan would depend on a number of factors but mainly on the intelligence TRA and the availability of resources OPS needed to request and secure resources before detailed sub-plans could be fully developed. The OPS's number one challenge was resources – the dependable, consistent and deployable resources under the ICS. Detailed sub-plans were evolving in response to intelligence and changes in the situation on the ground as well as availability of resources. Chief Sloly's experience at TPS was that an incident commander should identify the nature of the TRA/event, request and secure resources, and then detail out the sub-plans. If the commander over-requested resources, then the commander would return those resources to the agencies that provided them, just as the commander would request additional resources if the resources originally requested were not sufficient. It would be a mistake to perfect the sub-plans before requesting resources and getting assurances that the resources would be available. In Chief Sloly's experience, policing partners did not request a detailed plan or a copy of a plan before agreeing to send assistance. In fact, earlier in the demonstration, the OPP, RCMP and municipal agencies agreed to send help without requesting plan details or a copy of the plan.

[Weeks Two and Three \(February 7-15\): Chief Sloly's Leadership of OPS until his Resignation](#) [February 7 Request for 1800 Officers](#)

Following the February 6 evening meeting, the ICS team and other OPS members engaged in a 24-hour process to determine how many resources OPS needed. On February 7, Chief Sloly was informed that OPS needed almost 1800 police resources (the vast majority of which were police officers). The resources were broken down into categories which included POU, covert officers, investigators, civilian analysts. Chief Sloly did not determine this number, and it was not the result of simply doubling how many officers OPS actually needed. Ultimately, the 1800 police resources represented almost the exact number of officers that arrived in Ottawa and were used to implement the OPS plan that resolved the Freedom Convoy.

In a February 7 email to Mayor Watson, Chief Sloly requested additional resources, including the 1800 police resources the ICS team told Chief Sloly were needed, to



address the “ongoing illegal demonstration.”⁴⁷ Chief Sloly used the word “illegal” to indicate that he needed resources to end the illegal aspects of the Freedom Convoy. He had no authority to end any lawful protests that may have been associated with the Freedom Convoy in Ottawa. Chief Sloly considered that the protest was technically illegal because it did not obtain a permit. This alone, however, is not seen as a basis to put an end to a protest. Chief Sloly was primarily concerned with the overall level of unlawfulness (by-law, provincial offences, *Criminal Code*) as well as the overall level of trauma and disruptions taking place in and around the red zones and across the downtown core. He was not aware of any single body orchestrating all of the illegal actions as there was a range of groups and individuals who were affiliated with and/or attracted to the events related to the Freedom Convoy.

On February 7, Mayor Watson and Ms. Deans sent letters to the federal and provincial governments requesting that 1800 police resources be sent to Ottawa.⁴⁸ It was unusual for politicians to be involved in police resource requests, but the events surrounding the Freedom Convoy were unprecedented. The letters also included requests for other forms of assistance that the federal and provincial governments could provide, such as increasing fines for by-law and *Provincial Offences Act* violations. Chief Sloly does not think that OPSB ever asked him for the methodology behind his request for 1800 officers and how OPS would use them.

Chief Sloly publicly announced the request for 1800 police resources during a special City Council meeting on February 7. This was not his normal course of action, but the Freedom Convoy was unprecedented. Specifically, Ms. Deans asked Chief Sloly in a public OPSB meeting to provide a detailed report on the level of resources required.

When Chief Sloly requested 1800 officers, he understood that OPP was facing multiple competing resource demands across the province and so he did not expect that OPS would be at the front of the line. OPP was coordinating resource demands because there were multiple Freedom Convoy-related protests and blockades in Ontario, including in Toronto and Windsor. A few days after the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa, Chief Sloly communicated with Commissioner Carrique of the need to convene chiefs of police across Ontario to share intelligence and lessons learned – this later grew to include the OPP role in coordinating resource requests. Commissioner Carrique and the OPP assumed what Chief Sloly termed an “air traffic control” function for the overall resource requests.

Chief Sloly expected that the Ontario Solicitor General would have asked OPP to look at the list of resources requested in the letter from Mayor Watson and Ms. Deans and to action the request. He similarly expected that the federal Deputy Minister of Public Safety would have asked RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki to ensure that the resource request letter was considered. At the time, Chief Sloly was having daily calls with Commissioner Carrique and was also engaged with RCMP. The letters from Mayor

⁴⁷ OTT00005590.

⁴⁸ OTT00005513, -6057.



Watson and Ms. Deans did not undermine OPS's engagement and cooperation with OPP, RCMP, and other police forces.

February 7 City Council Motion for RCMP to Take Over Policing in the Parliamentary Precinct

On February 7, a motion was introduced at City Council calling for RCMP to take over policing in the Parliamentary Precinct.⁴⁹ Chief Sloly indicated that because OPS is the police of jurisdiction for all of Ottawa, including the Parliamentary Precinct, under the *Police Services Act* OPS should have maintained accountability and responsibility for all policing throughout the City. Chief Sloly was seeking assistance from the RCMP. The RCMP has previously assisted OPS in public order events such as Canada Day, but this assistance should remain under OPS overall command and pursuant to OPS's overall operational plan.

Chief Sloly supports highly integrated operations but would not have given up operational control of an Ottawa operation to another police force. He would have resisted any effort to remove and replace the OPS as the lead agency or the police of jurisdiction. Other Ontario police agencies are not responsible for delivering policing operations in Ottawa, just as Chief Sloly was not responsible for delivering policing operations outside of Ottawa. While he might request another police service to assist with highly sensitive internal investigations or politically sensitive criminal investigations, he would never ask another police service to assume responsibility for an entire component of core responsibilities, such as investigations or intelligence.

Impact of February 7 Private Injunction

On February 7, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted an Ottawa resident an interlocutory injunction prohibiting honking in downtown Ottawa.⁵⁰ Chief Sloly stated that this private injunction led to difficulties for OPS since it increased public pressure on police by creating an expectation that the OPS would undertake more aggressive interdiction efforts when it did not have the resources to do so.

Arrival of Integrated Planning Cell and Initial Meeting with OPS

On February 8, the OPS updated its operational plan – this included an expanded 8-point framework and a significantly increased level of multi-agency integration. The integration portion specifically involved the arrival of senior members of the OPP and RCMP in Ottawa to assist OPS in securing the requested 1800 police resources from across the country. Superintendent Phil Lue was the RCMP representative, and Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy was OPP's representative. Chief Sloly stated that the added level of integration enhanced existing efforts for two reasons. First, Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue were described to Chief Sloly as some of

⁴⁹ OTT00009219 at PDF p. 12.

⁵⁰ HRF00000073.



the best ICS operators who were experienced in complex, multi-jurisdictional, and long timeline events. He valued their expertise because OPS's command team was over-worked and tired, and their presence provided a morale, practical, and structural lift to OPS's efforts. Second, Chief Superintendent Pardy enhanced OPP's air traffic control function to coordinate resource requests because he was embedded in the OPS ICS and physically located in Ottawa, he could see both the local and the national pictures. Chief Sloly had confidence in Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue.

On February 8 at 5:35 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue held the first formal meeting with the OPS ICS team, including Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. This meeting took place at the RCMP HQ. Chief Sloly joined the meeting late because his house was undergoing a security assessment after threats against him and his family. Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was missing key members of the ICS team at the meeting but did her best to provide the briefing and address the questions put to her but she did not have key OPS ICS team members or documentation needed to provide sufficient answers. When Chief Sloly joined the meeting, it was clear to him that RCMP and OPP representatives did not feel they had enough information to agree to greater integration and to support the request for the additional resources to implement OPS's plan. Chief Sloly accordingly requested that the meeting be adjourned and be continued on February 9 at OPS headquarters. He characterized the meeting as helpful, but not conclusive.

[Discussion of Political Pressures at February 9 Morning Meeting](#)

During the Freedom Convoy, Chief Sloly was concerned that public and political pressures were eroding public trust in the OPS and in his leadership. There was considerable disinformation on social media and, to some extent, in mainstream media about whether OPS had a plan, whether that plan was effective, whether OPS needed the 1800 officers it requested, and whether OPS was failing to manage the demonstration. Chief Sloly was concerned about a February 6 announcement by the Solicitor General that OPP deployed 1500 officers to Ottawa.⁵¹ This statement was inaccurate, as 1500 OPP officers were not present in Ottawa, and it suggested that OPS had more than enough resources to do more than OPS was reportedly doing to address the Freedom Convoy. Chief Sloly contacted Commissioner Carrique on multiple occasions to correct the statement. Commissioner Carrique did so to Chief Sloly's satisfaction, and the inaccurate statement was clarified in an OPS communications piece later in the week of February 7.

In response to questions relating to a note taken by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson relating a comment made by Chief Sloly about the possibility that the OPP or the RCMP were being handled by "political masters", Chief Sloly stated that he wanted to communicate that OPS, RCMP and OPP should all be aware of political pressures which are inherent in the policing of all high-profile police operations. Chief Sloly had heard a reference to the RCMP's "political masters" and he may have shared his concerns with the implications of such a comment. He also had discussions with the OPS command team about political

⁵¹ COM00000432 at PDF pp. 358-359.



support and that the team should be mindful that politics could find its way into operations and affect OPS's ability to receive resources. He told them to be aware of external and internal politics, but not to let politics interfere with the integration of the OPP and RCMP and the implementation of a plan with them.

On February 9 at 9:15 a.m., Chief Sloly met with Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, and CAO Dunker. During this meeting, he mentioned that public officials were making problematic public statements that were (intended or not) contributing to the growing public distrust in OPS. He was referring to the Solicitor General's announcement as well as statements by other public officials. He stated that OPS needed to be careful to understand growing political pressures so that it could mitigate them in order to accomplish the full integration and implementation of the plan.

During this meeting, Chief Sloly indicated that one of the reasons the senior OPP and RCMP members were coming to Ottawa was likely to assess OPS's plans and that whether OPS would receive additional resources depended on how they viewed the OPS's plans. Chief Sloly thought that it would be reasonable for OPP to want to assess OPS's plans, and that he would have done so if he were Commissioner Carrique. He did not indicate at the meeting that this was the only reason they came to Ottawa and did not express cynicism about their motives. He also did not intend to suggest that OPS should write a plan that made the integration partners happy just so that they would support OPS's request for 1800 officers.

Chief Sloly did not make comments that the RCMP and OPP planners were being handled by their political masters and were not in Ottawa to help OPS. He never made a statement that OPP, RCMP, Chief Superintendent Pardy, or Superintendent Lue were untrustworthy or unable to fulfill their duties and promises. He trusted Commissioners Carrique's and Lucki's word that they were sending their best people and mobilizing resources to support OPS. He was not concerned that Chief Superintendent Pardy or Superintendent Lue would attempt to take control of the ICS. However, he was concerned that City councillors and municipal, provincial, and federal officials were hearing calls for another police service to come in and take over.

February 9 Meeting with Integrated Planning Cell

On February 9 at 12:10 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue along with other OPP and RCMP members met with Chief Sloly, the OPS command team and the ICS team at OPS headquarters. The meeting proceeded in three phases. First, Chief Sloly presented on the current situation. He advised that there was no road to a safe successful outcome with the OPS's existing resources. Second, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson presented the updated concept of operations and an overview of the updated operations plan. Third, Superintendent Patterson distributed copies of an updated version of the OPS plan, which outlined seven points (the **February 9 Plan**) as well as presenting details on current staffing levels and the details of the staffing request for the 1800 police resources. Chief Sloly recognized OPP00001889 as a copy of the February 9 Plan he reviewed.



Chief Sloly characterized the February 9 Plan as the third phase of the ongoing OPS plan. The first phase was the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan, and the second phase was the surge enforce, and contain plan that was announced on February 4. The February 9 Plan focused on an increased level of integration, obtaining resource certainty, and using the additional resources that were being provided to safely and successfully end the local Convoy events.

Chief Sloly cannot recall if he shared the seven points in the February 9 Plan with the media. However, repeated public statements from some OPSB members and some City councillors requesting details of the OPS plan and demanding exact timelines for the end of the local events were undermining public confidence and public trust. Chief Sloly was concerned that the growing demands for detailed planning information along with the ongoing and escalating social media fuelled misinformation and disinformation was creating an untrue perception that OPS lacked a plan. All of this was jeopardizing OPS's efforts to obtain the needed additional resources.

Chief Sloly emphasized the importance of resource predictability and consistency repeatedly during the February 9 meeting. He stated that that he needed to know that the OPP and RCMP were fully committed in their integration role to focus on providing the requested resources to OPS regardless of any inappropriate politics. He was deliberate in exploring this matter as it was crucial for public safety, member health and the successful end to the local events. He did not want to leave the meeting without a clear understanding of the priority needs for resource predictability and consistency because the OPS could not successfully resolve the Freedom Convoy events in Ottawa without those additional resources.

Chief Sloly recalled spending several hours in this meeting going over the details of the February 9 Plan to address all questions and concerns raised by policing partners. The meeting concluded with an agreement to implement the February 9 Plan. Chief Sloly considered the degree of integration agreed to be unprecedented and necessary. Once there was a consensus approval by all parties on the integration and the associated resource request, Chief Sloly understood that his role in relation to the February 9 Plan was complete because he had obtained agreement from the OPP and RCMP to get the requested resources and buy-in needed from OPP and RCMP to implement the OPS' plan.

[Discussions with Command Team Concerning Implementation of February 9 Plan](#)

Chief Sloly recalled that on February 9, he held a special meeting with Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, OPS general counsel Christine Huneault, CAO Dunker, and Inspector Kevin Maloney. This meeting took place after an internal OPS planning meeting but before the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting with Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue. His intent was to emphasize that the entire command team was signed off on the February 9 Plan. At the meeting, he stated that he would "crush" anyone who undermined the plan – Chief Sloly recognizes that it was an unfortunate choice of words but public safety, member health, wellness and safety and the successful



conclusion of the local Convoy events were all at a critical juncture and this required absolute command commitment to supporting the implementation of the updated plan. He restated the need for unity within the command to support the updated plan including the level of integration and the acquisition of the needed resources to safely and successfully end the events in Ottawa. There were to be no major changes to the plan, the concept of operations, the elevated integration and the senior ICS assignments without discussion about the need for such a change.

Discussion of and Cancellation of Rideau-Sussex Operation

Chief Sloly was briefed that Superintendent Patterson was planning to launch a significant nighttime operation to clear Rideau-Sussex but does not recall exactly when this plan was to take place. Addressing the blockade of the Rideau-Sussex intersection was one of Supt. Patterson's 2 or 3 top priorities. The other target was Coventry Road. Chief Sloly understood that there was a connection between OPS's capacity to clear Coventry Road and the resources which would eventually be available for Rideau-Sussex.

Chief Sloly would not be surprised if the Rideau-Sussex operation was discussed at the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting or if RCMP and OPP members would have raised questions. He viewed such questions as healthy given the new level of integration within the plan. The questions may also have been asked because the RCMP and OPP members may not yet have been provided a detailed briefing on the intelligence behind the operation.

Chief Sloly was involved in public order night operations during his time at TPS and OPS. Night operations bring additional risk, but also bring additional risk mitigations because there are usually less protestors, pedestrians, and traffic at such times. It is inaccurate to state that public order operations should never be conducted at night.

Chief Sloly does not recall the exact reason why the Rideau-Sussex operation was cancelled; he suspected that it would have been because of a change in intelligence and/or a lack of resources. In any event, the decision was Supt. Patterson's and Chief Sloly respected it. The unprecedented nature of the events meant that the OPS had challenges planning, communicating and coordinating operations - it was a large-scale, complex, fast-moving, fluid, and volatile set of events.

February 10 at 11:00 a.m. Briefing, Removal of Superintendent Patterson, and Appointment of Acting Superintendent Bernier as Event Commander

Chief Sloly attended a February 10 11:00 a.m. convoy briefing with the OPS command team. On February 10 at 3:28 p.m., Chief Sloly received an email from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's executive assistant that contained the notes from that briefing.⁵² That email contains the following bullets:⁵³

⁵² OPS00009648.

⁵³ *Id.*



- Chief – great work yesterday by the team working on the revised Ops plan; concern about the plan that was not carried out last night;
- Concern around the operation that was cancelled last night; agreement that the incident commander role needs to be objective and outside the planning process but someone who is within the command centre of the protest; process to be tightened, report back to Chief and get sign off on moving forward;

Chief Sloly understood that the reference to “[c]oncern about the operation that was cancelled last night” referred to related operations at the Rideau-Sussex intersection and Coventry Road operation that Superintendent Patterson cancelled on the evening of February 9. He and others were concerned that OPS did not achieve what it was looking to achieve with these operations and there was agreement that OPS should continue its efforts to safely and successfully end the local events. He did not recall the context for the second bullet point.

The email also contained the following bullet:

- Briefings to change to Project Hydra – earlier in the morning, just command team and team to brief; K. Maloney to speak to A/DC Ferguson about a possible evening briefing

During the interview, Chief Sloly did not recall what “Project Hydra” was. With the benefit of his notes, Chief Sloly now recognizes that he used this term to draw an analogy between the convoy related protests and the mythological monster with multiple heads.

The email also contained the following bullet:

- Outcome of RCMP and OPP meeting; ensure follow-up occurred for the specific request for the plan from them; #1 issue – getting resources to create and accelerate operations; if met with resistance, alert A/DC Ferguson and Supt. Patterson and engage Chief if necessary; meeting at 1pm at TPOF, OPS well-represented;

Chief Sloly believed that the “RCMP and OPP meeting” referred to the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting. OPS presented the RCMP and OPP with the February 9 Plan at that meeting, and Chief Sloly therefore does not recall that they requested “the plan”. RCMP and OPP may have asked for more information about the February 9 Plan, and Chief Sloly would have asked a member of the command team to follow-up on that request.

The email also contained the following bullet:

- Officers from RCMP and OPP still reluctant to do any enforcement or interdiction; must be made clear to them and their organizations what the expectations are; if they don’t comply, they are to be returned home; C. Huneault to review the MOUs to determine that no restrictions on duty assignments exist; J. Steinbachs – there needs to be someone from senior command to brief the troops coming in about



their authorities, happy to assist; K. Maloney and M. Fortunato to prepare letter today to inquire about resources, state we will have a central point of contact and coordination; Chief would like clarification on whether OPP and RCMP have embedded currently or are a separate entity; C. Rheume working on this; formal email with full incident command chain – by 4pm;

Chief Sloly did not recall who the “someone from senior command” referenced in this bullet was. He did recall that Superintendent Patterson voiced concern during the February 10 11:00 a.m. briefing that officers from police agencies assisting OPS, including OPP officers, were refusing to perform enforcement or interdiction tasks. Chief Sloly requested that legal services examine OPS’s MOUs with those police agencies and identify if those MOUs restricted the deployment of those agencies’ officers. Restrictions on officers’ roles were challenging for the Incident Commander. Chief Sloly’s view was that consistency was essential under the integrated command model and that it would be problematic to have officers subject to operational limitations. He needed officers who were willing and able to be fully deployed by the ICS leadership under the updated integrated plan.

The scribe notes of the February 10 11:00 a.m. briefing record the following statement by Superintendent Patterson:⁵⁴

“Patterson indicated he was concerned w OPP being the incident command given they don’t have any interest in this getting resolved – for fear it will move elsewhere in the province.”

Chief Sloly did not recall Superintendent Patterson stating that OPP did not have any interest in resolving the Freedom Convoy in Ottawa for fear that it would move elsewhere in Ontario. He also did not recall any discussion of concerns about OPP having a greater role in the incident command system around this time. He noted that he was advised that the OPS was increasing the agreed integration in the days after the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting.

During a discussion about integrating PLT into operations at the 11:00 a.m. meeting, Superintendent Patterson became agitated and accused Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson of undermining him by colluding with her spouse, Staff Sergeant John Ferguson, who was supervising PLT. Chief Sloly viewed Superintendent Patterson’s comments as out of line and perceived that they caused a break in the relationship between Superintendent Patterson and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. After the meeting, Chief Sloly visited Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson in her office to do a wellness check in which he observed that she was very emotional and very tired. He sought her input on the incident involving Superintendent Patterson’s actions. Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson told Chief Sloly that Superintendent Patterson had acted unprofessionally and that she no longer felt she could work with him as Event Commander. Chief Sloly agreed and then asked Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to take time off and get rest – he advised that Deputy Chief Bell could take over her MIC role temporarily until her return. She appreciated the support and

⁵⁴ OPS00014454 at PDF p. 142.



agreed to go home and rest. Chief Sloly later phoned Superintendent Patterson and advised that the earlier incident resulted in a relationship rupture with the MIC such that he could no longer serve as Event Commander. He would return to his role as head of the Intelligence Directorate. Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson took February 11 off work and returned to work on the morning of February 12.

Integrated Planning Cell's February 10 Assessment

During the interview, Chief Sloly was shown an excerpt from a February 10 draft demobilization plan. This document identifies the authors as RCMP, OPP, TPS, York Regional Police and Peel Regional Police.⁵⁵ Section 3.1 of that document described the police response to the Freedom Convoy to date as follows:⁵⁶

3.1 Deployment Plan

Current

- Not Intelligence Led
- Participants have the initiative – Have retired police tactical leaders guiding (chief of security)
- Reactive, tactical, aggressive, risk
- Poor communications
 - No communication strategy (internal/external)
- Unclear and vague Command & control
- Unqualified trained leadership
- No or poor partner collaboration
 - Lack of collaboration
 - Strategy
 - Tactical
 - Focused on local issues only – no national perspective
- OPS focus is only maintenance and not resolution
- Boots on the ground

⁵⁵ OPP00004283.

⁵⁶ *Id.* at PDF pp. 3-4.



- Low moral
- Frustration
- Lack of leadership/confidence of command- no clear direction
- Physical & mental – exhausted
 - Poor decision making
 - Longer
- Information sharing – incomplete and unknown command structure/OP not signed off
- Logistics
 - Hotel, staging, joining instructions/creature comforts Comms Tools/PPE
 - Network sharing
 - Info incomplete - unknown command structure
 - Org Chart not developed
 - Police resources - Not integrated
- Police Vulnerability – Business Continuity

Chief Sloly had not seen this document before the interview. He commented that he had never seen police officers from agencies who are assisting the police of jurisdiction come in without any prior notice to the Chief or any of his executive staff and then proceed to an assessment of the police of jurisdiction's performance without their input. He supports after action reports and would not be opposed to such a review involving members of external police services. That said, he did not feel this was a productive effort and was not a practice he would recommend for future such events. Chief Sloly acknowledged that OPS was tired and desperately needed resources but stated that he felt this assessment was unhelpful as it was drafted without proper context, sufficient information, or communication with the OPS and with limited exposure to what OPS had gone through over the previous two weeks.

Acting Superintendent Bernier's Appointment as Event Commander

After Superintendent Patterson's removal, Chief Sloly consulted with Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to choose the next Event Commander. Superintendent Paul Burnett and Acting Superintendent Robert Bernier were considered as options. Superintendent Burnett was running OPS operations for the rest of the city and Chief Sloly needed him to continue to do so as he was doing an excellent job. Chief Sloly agreed with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Deputy Chief Bell that Acting Superintendent Bernier was the best choice and had the right training and experience. Acting Superintendent Bernier began to serve as Event Commander on February 10 and continued in that role until the end of the Freedom Convoy.

After Acting Superintendent Bernier was appointed Event Commander, he told Chief Sloly that he needed independence to make operational decisions. Chief Sloly agreed. Acting Superintendent Bernier did not tell Chief Sloly that he was concerned that he lacked independence to make operational decisions. Acting Superintendent Bernier also did not



tell Chief Sloly that he had concerns about the February 9 Plan, including concerns about a lack of detail. Acting Superintendent Bernier did state that he was going to have to develop a range of sub-plans to implement the overall operations plan.

Chief Sloly recalled that Acting Superintendent Bernier brought in OPP Inspector Dave Springer to assist him as a Deputy Event Commander. Inspector Springer seemed experienced and had a good relationship with Acting Superintendent Bernier.

Chief Sloly expected that Acting Superintendent Bernier would have been properly briefed on the new level of integration under the updated operational plan by the MIC and/or other ICS members. Chief Sloly could not recall if he provided such a briefing to Acting Superintendent Bernier when they met on February 11. In the interview, Chief Sloly stated that he would have been surprised to learn that Acting Superintendent Bernier was not aware of the elevated degree of integration until February 12th because on February 8 and 9 OPS was meeting with the OPP and RCMP and reached a consensus agreement on integration. Acting Superintendent Bernier was part of the ICS team and would likely have been aware of these meetings and their outcome.

February 11 at 5:06 p.m. Meeting & Legal Review of Operational Plans

Chief Sloly wanted OPS's general counsel, Ms. Huneault, to review all major event related documentation including the versions of the OPS' operational plans, private injunctions, emergency declaration and memorandums of understanding due to the unique and unprecedented circumstances OPS was facing. Specifically, Chief Sloly recalled that, during a February 11 at 5:06 p.m. briefing, he asked OPS's legal services to review the new mission statement that Acting Superintendent Bernier had developed.

Chief Sloly never asked Ms. Huneault to approve an operational plan. He also never directed anyone, including Ms. Huneault, that an operational plan could not be implemented until she reviewed it. He never intended that there be any delay with the implementation of the operational plan while Ms. Huneault reviewed it or any other document.

During the meeting, Chief Sloly asked to be informed of any major changes to the core ICS team. He did not say that his permission was required for such changes, merely that he wanted to be informed of them and the reason for them. This was consistent with what he told Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson on February 5 when he learned that Superintendent Dunlop had taken over as Event Commander.

February 12 11:45 a.m. Call with Chief Superintendent Pardy

Chief Sloly did not specifically recall speaking with Chief Superintendent Pardy on February 12 at 11:45 a.m. He indicated that he would have told Chief Superintendent Pardy to carry on with his efforts to enhance integration and secure the requested resources. If Chief Superintendent Pardy sought his input on the operational plan, he would have indicated that he had not seen any versions of the operational plan other than the February 9 Plan but that Chief Superintendent Pardy and the ICS team should carry



on refining and implementing the operational plan. He did not communicate that he was unsure about how integration would occur, rather, Chief Sloly was expressing that he had not been briefed on any of the developments which had occurred over the last three days and accordingly was not up to date as to how the agreed upon integration was being implemented.

Chief Sloly would only want to be briefed on major changes from the February 9 Plan and the agreement reached at the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting. He provided three examples of major changes: (1) changes in key ICS personnel, such as the MIC, Event Commander or Incident Commander, (2) significant diversion from the agreed integration and (3) any possibility of removal of OPS from its lead role.

February 12 2:00 p.m. call with Commissioners Lucki and Carrique

On February 12 at 2:00 p.m., Chief Sloly and Deputy Chief Bell spoke with Commissioners Lucki and Carrique. Chief Sloly told Commissioner Carrique that he understood how negotiations with ICS and POU operations worked but that he was not familiar with the specifics of the PLT training, nomenclature and techniques. Chief Sloly was familiar with officers performing liaison and negotiation work and the principles of conflict de-escalation and mediation within the ICS model from his time at TPS. However, the PLT role was something that had been formalized and evolved in municipal policing during his time in the private sector

During the call, Commissioner Lucki expressed concern that his public request for 1800 officers was creating officer safety issues. Chief Sloly recalls defending the decision as it had been made by his Board Chair, Ms. Deans, at a public meeting. While Chief Sloly admits that he would not normally have necessarily released this information, this was an extraordinary request regarding an unprecedented set of events.

Chief Sloly advised that he had not yet been briefed on the latest version of the operational plan from his team. Nonetheless, he told Commissioners Lucki and Carrique that there was ongoing work on the integration, resource acquisition and implementation of the OPS' operational plan. He simply had not seen the latest version of the operational plan since the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting. The key areas of the operational plan he wanted to be updated on were: its integrated element, any substantive changes to it, and the PLT strategy. The last point was important to him because Commissioner Carrique told him during the call that OPP implemented a PLT strategy in Windsor that appeared to be successful.

He explicitly stated that he was not attempting to delay the implementation of the operational plan in any way and that he did not direct that implementation should be paused for any reason.

February 12 3:10 p.m. Meeting with Integrated Planning Cell

Chief Sloly did not have a specific recollection of the February 12 3:10 p.m. meeting described by others. He did not recall speaking harshly to his command team at the start



of the call or that Chief Superintendent Pardy asked him if he wanted the non-OPS officers to leave so he could discuss matters with his team. He commented that February 12 was a busy, long, and complex day, and that he had multiple matters to discuss with his command and senior leadership team. He suspects that he may have started this meeting with his colleagues from the OPS and that members from the OPP and RCMP may have joined while a contentious issue was being discussed.

Chief Sloly did not recall that RCMP Sergeant Darwin Tetreault presented a slide deck of the concept of operations during the call. Regardless, the concept of operations presented was a restatement and refining of the February 9th plan. Elements such as a measured approach, strategic communication to rebuild confidence in OPS, using PLT to negotiate and communicate, and dismantling the blockades with a POU plan once voluntary compliance was no longer feasible were consistent with the February 9 Plan. Chief Sloly would not be surprised if Sergeant Tetreault's presentation included those topics. He would also not be surprised if there was discussion of the role of strategic messaging and having a unified command to develop daily objectives, as these would be important in an enhanced and coordinated operation. He did not recall discussing any specific timelines for operations during this call.

[Efforts to Restrict Access to Downtown Ottawa During the February 12-13 Weekend](#)

Chief Sloly understood that by February 11, the City was interested in hardening the downtown. He understood that "hardening" referred to blocking streets, interprovincial bridges, and 400-series highways.

During the February 12-13 weekend, Chief Sloly gave a direct order to close all interprovincial bridges. Chief Sloly rescinded that direction after Acting Superintendent Bernier advised that he had developed a plan in coordination with SQ to manage an influx of convoy participants without full bridge closures.

[February 13 Counter-Demonstration](#)

Chief Sloly was aware that Ottawa residents blocked access to a convoy approaching Ottawa on February 13 at the intersection of Bank Street and Riverside Drive. OPS was overstretched and lacked enough resources to block every potential route of every potential element of the convoy. This specific counter-demonstration required OPS to deploy resources away from the downtown core to manage the event and would therefore likely have impacted other planned operations.

[February 13: OPS Plan 3.0 Email Chain](#)

On February 13 at 3:39 p.m., Chief Sloly sent the following email to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, copying Acting Superintendent Bernier and Ms. Huneault:⁵⁷

⁵⁷ OPP00001547 at PDF p. 3.



**PUBLIC ORDER
EMERGENCY
COMMISSION**

**COMMISSION
SUR L'ÉTAT
D'URGENCE**

Trish

Please send me the latest version of the Operations Plan that I approved on Wednesday Feb 9. 2022.

Also please advise if the plan has received all official approvals/signatures/etc as there seems to be some concerns about this from the RCMP.

Thank you.

ps

Chief Sloly stated that he may have sent this email because on February 12 or 13, Commissioner Lucki told him during a call that there was concern that the implementation of the operational plan was being delayed and that he had been holding it up. Chief Sloly told her that he was not aware of any delays in the implementation of the operational plan. He reinforced that his approval was not required for any implementation of the plan. To Chief Sloly's knowledge, the February 9 plan was being implemented as per the agreement reached with the OPS's partners. Chief Sloly wanted to determine the plan's status and whether it had been signed off. He copied Ms. Huneault as standard practice because this was one of her responsibilities to review all major event related documents – this included the versions of the operational plans

At 5:58 p.m., Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson replied to Chief Sloly's email:⁵⁸

Good Evening Chief,

In checking with Rob Bernier, he finally had a chance to review the plan from the Integrated Planning team and has sent it back with his comments.

He would prefer that it be completed and signed off and will then share the plan, as he is the final approver of it.

As for version 3.0,
Ottawa Truck Demo '22 (9 Feb '22) (Phase 2.1 v3.0) Final.docx

Trish

Chief Sloly did not understand why Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson attached the February 9 Plan, rather than the more recent version of operational plan 3.0 that Acting Superintendent Bernier and the integrated team were working on. Chief Sloly was advised that Acting Superintendent Bernier wanted some changes to the latest version of the operational plan before he (Acting Superintendent Bernier) signed it. There was no requirement for Chief Sloly to sign the plan at any time.

At 8:07 p.m., Chief Sloly replied to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's email:⁵⁹

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Id.* at PDF p. 2.



Trish

Thank you for the clarification.

I was not aware of this delay as I had approved the plan last Wednesday.

I appreciate and support the need for A/Supt Bernier to make adjustments to the plan that he inherited.

That said, please ensure that the plan is fully signed off at the earliest possible opportunity as this is a priority need expressed by our integrated partners.

As such please communicate via email to the OPP and RCMP the reason for the delay in the approval of the current plan along with the timeline that they will receive the approved plan (copy Christiane and I on these emails).

Thank you.

ps

Chief Sloly was not aware of any delay in implementing the plan. His understanding was that OPS, OPP, and RCMP had all agreed to the February 9 Plan. After that meeting, the plan was being implemented with the agreed upon greater integration. The integrated team was assembling the requested resources that would allow the OPS to shift from a largely reactive to a more proactive and effective approach.

At 9:33 p.m., Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson replied to Chief Sloly's email:⁶⁰

Good Evening Chief,

The plan that was sent to you just now is one that both C/Supt. Pardy and Supt. Leu worked on to include the additional and necessary parts to ensure it met everyone's needs.

Both Carson and Phil were aware of the reason for the delay, as they had been in regular contact with Rob yesterday and into today. The plan now has the proper signatories on it and will be the one referenced moving forward.

I thank everyone for their patience and effort in getting such a sound plan together- it has been a herculean lift and we have now landed in a place everyone is comfortable working in.

I suspect, knowing these two professionals, they will have shared with their respective chains and hopefully any confusion or gaps are now sorted.

Best,

Trish

Chief Sloly did not know why Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson stated that "getting such a sound plan together ... has been a herculean lift."⁶¹ He appreciated all such efforts were intense and demanding. What he wanted to know, and what Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson told him, is that the updated version of the operational plan (the **February 13**

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ *Id.*



Plan) had been signed so that he could inform Commissioners Carrique and Lucki of that fact. Chief Sloly recognized OPP00001851 as a version of the February 13 Plan, but indicated that there were three signatures in the version he reviewed; OPS Acting Superintendent Bernier, OPP Chief Superintendent Pardy, and RCMP Superintendent Lue.

At 10:16 p.m., Chief Sloly forwarded his email chain with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to Commissioners Lucki and Carrique.⁶² This was intended to address any remaining concerns that they had regarding the status of the plan – it had not been delayed by him, it had been signed off by the respective designates from the 3 organizations and it was being implemented.

Good evening Brenda and Tom,

Please be advised our Operational Plan was updated per the integrated model with the input of your respective representatives and has now been fully approved.

See below for confirmation and further context.

Best regards,

ps

Chief Sloly's intent was to communicate that the operational plan had been signed and fully approved, and that OPS had been working on implementing and updating the operational plan since February 9.

Comparison of February 9 & February 13 Plans

The February 13 Plan included the contents of the February 9 Plan, but with additional layers of detail, refinements and enhancements that had occurred over the four days. The February 13 Plan was a better articulated document that had benefited from the work of the new Event Commander and the enhanced ICS team over the previous four days. That said this updated version did not contain any substantially different concept of operations, new priorities or areas of focus. Chief Superintendent Pardy, Superintendent Lue, and Acting Superintendent Bernier signed the February 13 Plan. Chief Sloly did not sign the February 13 Plan because it did not require his approval or signature.

Chief Sloly recalled that the February 9 Plan was supported by sub-plans for area-by-area clearance operations. He understood that the February 13 Plan also contained sub-plans for clearing specific areas.

The February 9 Plan was based on the following seven points:⁶³

⁶² *Id.* at PDF p. 1.

⁶³ OPP00001889 at PDF pp. 8-9.



- 1) Negotiations;
- 2) Surge, enforce & contain;
- 3) Intelligence & investigations;
- 4) Red zone reduction;
- 5) 24/72 hour cycles;
- 6) Resource reliability; and,
- 7) Establishing success factors.

Chief Sloly understood at his interview that the seven points that the February 9 Plan established were incorporated in the February 13 Plan. For instance, the February 13 Plan incorporated the February 9 Plan's Red Zone reduction point by discussing measured PLT action and negotiation to reduce the Red Zone until negotiations were exhausted.

The February 9 Plan contemplated that federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government would participate in negotiations.⁶⁴ Chief Sloly considered their involvement to be appropriate because the Freedom Convoy had become a national security crisis and all three levels of government were asking OPS how they could support negotiations. Federal, provincial, and municipal involvement did not take away from PLT's role. Chief Sloly stated that "Negotiations" was the first point in the seven-point strategy to reflect the emphasis that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and others wanted for the PLT role to continue to be a core element of the plan. Despite this, Chief Sloly understood that PLT's role under the February 9 Plan was the same as its role under the Pre-Arrival Operational Plan. Specifically, negotiations and PLT were to support every other point of the February 9 Plan. Chief Sloly was not aware of any divergent opinions on the command team or the ICS team about the role of PLT, but any divergences between Superintendent Patterson and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson may not have been raised to his level. Chief Sloly viewed PLT as an important part of the ICS, as important as other parts. Negotiation was important because it allowed OPS to employ a measured approach that would reduce the likelihood of injury, death, and rioting.

Chief Sloly understood that the focus of the "Red Zone Reduction" point of the February 9 Plan was to shrink the size of the Red Zone. Policing the Red Zone strained OPS's staffing and until it was cleared Ottawa would remain occupied. Chief Sloly does not recall having opposed efforts by PLT to consolidate the Red Zone and he indicated that PLT-level discussions like that would not have been elevated to his office. He did not direct anyone to implement a "not one inch" policy.

Chief Sloly understood that the "Surge, Enforce & Contain" point focused on enforcement, including by interdicting fuel and fining protestors was primarily to better protect residents, service providers and businesses outside of the Red Zone. He had no concerns if Acting Superintendent Bernier subsequently decided to de-emphasize enforcement and prioritize other tasks.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at PDF p. 8.



The February 9 Plan stated that “Media Relations and Corporate Communications are available throughout the event.”⁶⁵ Chief Sloly indicated that this statement may have been supported by more detailed communication sub-plans.

The February 13 Plan contains the following diagram in the “Strategic Messaging Development Cycle” subsection:⁶⁶



Chief Sloly could not recall during the interview (and without the plans in front of him) whether the February 9 Plan included this level of detail but indicated that OPS may have employed a similar process before the February 13 Plan was adopted. His understanding remains that PLT was always critical in OPS operations, including in communications.


⁶⁵ *Id.* at PDF p. 25.

⁶⁶ OPP00001851 at PDF p. 17.



The February 9 Plan contained the following organizational chart, which placed corporate communications as a layer between the executive command team and the Event Commander.⁶⁷

Organizational Chart



Chief Sloly indicated that corporate communications was an OPS business unit that performed an executive function on a daily basis and that it was not part of the ICS. He expected that ICS would have a designated communications function to provide ICS-related communication – this function would have been supported by the OPS' Corporate Communications unit.

The February 9 and 13 Plans contained the following mission statements:⁶⁸

February 9 Plan

⁶⁷ OPP00001889 at PDF p. 24.

⁶⁸ OPP00001889 at PDF p. 6; OPP00001851 at PDF p. 8.



2.0 MISSION

2.1 Mission Statement:

To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore safe and open neighborhoods and businesses.

February 13 Plan

2.0 Mission

Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, and maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration, with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights and Freedoms with priority on community and emergency services personnel safety & wellbeing.

2.1 Objectives

1. To facilitate a resolution through de-escalation, graduated measurable and multi-phased response while ensuring the safety of participants, citizen and members of participating agencies; and
2. Return the City of Ottawa to state of normality.

While the February 9 Plan's mission statement did not mention integration, the February 9 Plan mentioned the use of a unified command and this had been agreed to at the February 9, 12:10 p.m. meeting. The mission statement should be clear and succinct and does not need to repeat other elements in the document.

Chief Sloly agreed that the February 13 Plan's mission statement was longer than the February 9 Plan's mission statement. The February 13 Plan may have included an expanded mission statement because of the significant integration and progress made between February 9-13.

Chief Sloly saw the February 13 Plan's objective of "facilitat[ing] a resolution through de-escalation, graduated measurable and multi-phased response" as consistent with the February 9 Plan. The February 9 Plan's first point was negotiations, and nothing in the February 9 Plan ruled out or discounted employing de-escalation and a graduated response.

The "Concept of Operations" section of the February 13 Plan contained the following statement:⁶⁹


⁶⁹ OPP00001851 at PDF p. 10.



Ultimately, the ideal outcome would be negotiating the complete withdrawal of all protesters in the City of Ottawa. However, in the event that a core group remains in spite of all negotiation efforts and clear education on potential legal consequences of continued illegal occupation, this plan supports the further removal of occupiers through a combination of enforcement, arrest and Public Order actions.

Chief Sloly accepted that the February 9 Plan, unlike the February 13 Plan, did not mention that enforcement should proceed if a core group remained despite all negotiations. It is common sense that the ideal outcome would be negotiating complete withdrawal of all protestors. The February 13 Plan did not make PLT the only operational actor and prohibit enforcement, but instead, stated that, where possible, PLT should be allowed to reduce risks as much as possible.

The February 13 Plan contained the following organization chart:⁷⁰



Chief Sloly thought that this organizational chart was very good but he did not view this organizational chart as a major deviation from the February 9 Plan. Rather, he stated that the chart appropriately illustrated the complications and intricacies of integrated command. He observed that there are dotted lines between the OPS command team and

⁷⁰ *Id.* at PDF p. 22.



the OPP and RCMP command teams, as well as between the OPS strategic level of command and the OPP and RCMP strategic levels of command. Chief Sloly indicated that these dotted lines mean that OPP and RCMP cannot direct OPS, consistent with the *Ontario Police Services Act*. The February 13 Plan thus clearly established OPS as the police of jurisdiction, and he had no concern that it undermined OPS's role as the police of jurisdiction.

Chief Sloly understood that the organizational chart allowed for coordination and de-confliction. De-confliction at the operational level would occur between Acting Superintendent Bernier, Deputy Event Commander Inspector Springer, and the RCMP operational lead. If they could not resolve the conflict, then the strategic command level would attempt to resolve the conflict. If the strategic command level could not do so, then the conflict would be elevated to Chief Sloly's OPS command team level. If the OPS command team could not resolve the conflict with the OPP and RCMP command teams, then Chief Sloly would have ultimate accountability to make decisions. During Chief Sloly's tenure as Chief, no conflicts were elevated to his level for resolution.

Chief Sloly acknowledged that the February 9 Plan did not contemplate the creation of an OPS-OPP-RCMP steering committee at the operational or strategic levels as the February 13 Plan did. The February 13 Plan established clear integration, decision-making, oversight, and de-confliction at a level Chief Sloly never witnessed before. This level of integration was significantly higher than the level of integration at NCRCC. This level of integration would likely only be required for extremely rare, paradigm-shifting, and unprecedented events, not for ordinary events. When he reviewed the February 13 Plan, he supported this change.

Chief Sloly had no specific recollection that Superintendent Drummond served as executive liaison between him and Acting Superintendent Bernier and was not aware of any concerns that might have necessitated the creation of an executive liaison role. He was not surprised that the February 13 Plan's organizational chart included an "executive liaison" function.⁷¹ He indicated that Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal used an executive liaison role around 2007-2008, and that he subsequently introduced it and utilized it at TPS. He understood that an executive liaison is a senior officer who is responsible for briefing the executive and command team on ICS operations, and is usually a credible, skilled communicator.

February 14-15: Status of Operational Plan Approval

During the course of the Freedom Convoy, Chief Sloly never did or said anything to indicate that his approval of OPS's operational plan was required. Like all the other versions of the plan, the February 13 Plan did not contain a line for his signature, and there was no requirement for him to approve or sign it. He never directed anyone that his approval was required for the February 13 Plan. Any requirement for further approval of the operational plan would defeat the whole purpose of the ICS. Similarly, he never gave

⁷¹ *Id.* at p. 22.



the February 13 Plan to Ms. Huneault to approve. Chief Sloly understood the ICS boundaries well because of his training and experience, he respected the Event Commander's autonomy, and does not feel that he overstepped these boundaries – particularly given the unprecedented nature of the events.

Chief Sloly did not specifically recall speaking with Commissioner Lucki on February 14, but he did recall that Commissioner Lucki asked him why he had not signed off on the February 13 Plan. He was shocked and surprised by that question because the February 13 Plan did not contain a line for his signature. He had also told Commissioner Lucki that his approval was not required, and he had already expressed his support for the February 9 Plan including the greater integration. He further advised that the OPS ICS had been working with OPP and RCMP in an integrated manner to implement this plan. He did not recall if Commissioner Lucki asked him whether he had communicated to OPS officers that his approval of the February 13 Plan was not required. His response would have been that it was unnecessary for him to do so because none of the previous versions required his approval – because he had already given support to the greater integration contemplated on February 9. He did not recall if Commissioner Lucki asked him why the February 13 Plan had not yet been actioned. He would have been surprised by such a question because the February 13 Plan was being actioned and sub-plans to support its implementation were being developed.

During the interview, Chief Sloly was read an excerpt from a document in which Chief Superintendent Pardy told Commissioner Carrique on February 15 that “elephant in the room is everything we have been done so far – have been blocked by OPS Chief.”⁷² Chief Sloly stated that he was surprised by Chief Superintendent Pardy's statement. None of Chief Sloly's statements to Chief Superintendent Pardy should have given him that impression. Chief Sloly had limited direct interactions with Chief Superintendent Pardy, and Chief Superintendent Pardy likely formed this impression as a result of conversations with others who may have been discontent with Chief Sloly. Commissioner Carrique informed Chief Sloly of any concerns from his OPP members in a timely, professional manner. Commissioner Carrique never told Chief Sloly about Chief Superintendent Pardy's statement nor did Commissioner Carrique ever raise a concern that Chief Sloly was in any way blocking or undermining what the new integrated team was trying to accomplish.

City-Protestor Negotiations Between February 9-14

Chief Sloly did not recall that Deputy Chief Bell called Mr. Kanellakos on February 10 and did not recall whether he had been aware of that call at the time. Even if Chief Sloly was advised of the call that Deputy Chief Bell made to advance PLT's work, there was never any information from Deputy Chief Bell that this call by him to City Manager Kanellakos was intended to ask the Mayor to enter into negotiations with the Convoy leaders and Dean French.

⁷² OPP00001785 at PDF p. 28.



On February 12, Mr. Kanellakos informed Chief Sloly that the City was negotiating with Freedom Convoy leaders. Mr. Kanellakos did not say that this was a request that came from Deputy Chief Bell or any other member of the OPS. Mr. Kanellakos stated that this negotiation was initiated by Dean French, a former political aide to Premier Doug Ford, as self-appointed third-party interlocutor. Mr. Kanellakos asked if Chief Sloly had any major concerns with these negotiations. Chief Sloly believed it was reasonable for the City to engage with protestors, and the federal and provincial governments were similarly engaging with protestors at other locations at the time: Chief Sloly had been advised that the Solicitor General was engaging with protestors at the Ambassador Bridge and a federal minister had spoken in Mississauga with truckers going to the Queen's Park convoy. He understood that the City's aim was to remove trucks from residential neighbourhoods into areas outside of the downtown core including some farmland. The goal was to reduce the impact on downtown residents and businesses as well as to help end the events. There was no information provided by Mr. Kanellakos that the trucks would be relocated in the red zone areas. Mr. Kanellakos asked for maximum confidentiality on these negotiations given they were still in the early stages.

Chief Sloly told Mr. Kanellakos that the City could not direct OPS and that OPS would not implement any agreement that conflicted with OPS operations and plans. He also told Mr. Kanellakos that, if the negotiations were consistent with OPS's operational plans that OPS would assist with the logistics of implementing it. He did not ask for details about the negotiations, and instead told Mr. Kanellakos that he would wait to hear more about them. He understood that the City, not OPS was negotiating with protestors. If the negotiations resulted in an agreement, OPS would be invited to participate in a meeting where an OPS representative would be advised what was negotiated, could share any concerns and could assist with the logistics of implementing the agreement.

Mr. Kanellakos asked Chief Sloly if OPS would provide a senior officer to coordinate efforts to implement the deal. Chief Sloly agreed and asked Superintendent Robert Drummond to assist. Superintendent Drummond was selected because his rank and his ICS role allowed him to appropriately assess and address OPS/ICS concerns. Superintendent Drummond's role was to ensure that the agreement would be consistent with the overall OPS plan, to determine how the OPS would support the implementation of the agreement, and to communicate the agreement within the OPS/ICS. Chief Sloly did not recall if he expressly communicated that role to Superintendent Drummond. Chief Sloly expected that PLT would be informed through Superintendent Drummond via the ICS.

Chief Sloly supported the negotiations in principle and viewed them as a potential net benefit. While political involvement in negotiations outside of PLT efforts added complexity, this was understandable given the unprecedented circumstances. Chief Sloly was not concerned that the negotiations constituted political interference in police operations because he would not have accepted political direction. No one in the OPS or the ICS ever expressed concern to him that having the City negotiate with protestors was inconsistent with OPS's status as the lead agency responding to the Freedom Convoy.



On February 13, Chief Sloly received a letter from Mayor Watson to Tamara Lich concerning the negotiations.⁷³ He proposed an edit to the letter to reflect the OPS resource challenges that might affect the timing of the move, but Mr. Kanellakos informed him that no changes could be made because the letter had already been signed and sent to the Freedom Convoy leaders.⁷⁴ He understood that Mayor Watson sent the letter after negotiations had reached agreement. The letter contained the following statement:⁷⁵

I am writing to ask that you remove your convoy and its trucks from all of our residential neighbourhoods and that you restrict your presence to a limited perimeter from Wellington Street where it meets Elgin Street and to the Sir John A. Macdonald Parkway.

Chief Sloly did not understand this passage to contemplate moving more trucks onto Wellington St. between Elgin St. and the Sir John A. MacDonald Parkway. Rather, he understood it to mean that trucks would be moving out of residential neighbourhoods and that only trucks already on Wellington between Elgin St. and the Sir John A. MacDonald Parkway would remain.

On February 14, OPS assisted a movement of Freedom Convoy vehicles out of residential areas. Less than 100 vehicles moved, which was less than the scale of vehicles indicated by the City's agreement with Freedom Convoy leaders. Chief Sloly was not informed that the Event Commander, then Acting Superintendent Bernier, decided to stop removing vehicles from residential areas.

Chief Sloly was not aware that any of the trucks moved onto Wellington St. in front of Parliament. Any such movement would have been contrary to his understanding of the negotiations. Relieving pressure in residential areas was beneficial but adding any additional trucks to the Red Zone could have increased public safety issues.

Chief Sloly recalled that PPS's Acting Director, RCMP Superintendent Larry Brookson, was concerned around this time about the presence of trucks near Parliament buildings. Superintendent Brookson wanted to speak to the City and the Mayor about these concerns so Chief Sloly referred Superintendent Brookson to Mr. Kanellakos. Chief Sloly also informed Commissioner Carrique of the agreement.

Interactions with OPSB During Weeks Two and Three

On February 15 at 9:05 a.m., Mr. Steinbachs copied Chief Sloly on his reply to an email from one of Ms. Deans' staffers that requested Chief Sloly "provide an overview of the Plan to end this occupation" to OPSB. The staffer indicated that OPSB was seeking this information so that it could release a statement similar to the one the Toronto Police Services Board (**TPSB**) put out concerning convoy protest activity after a briefing by the

⁷³ See OPS00010796, -797.

⁷⁴ OPS00010795.

⁷⁵ OPS00010797.



TPS.⁷⁶ Chief Sloly indicated that he provided high-level briefings on OPS's priorities and objectives relating to the Freedom Convoy before it arrived and during its time in Ottawa. He expected that his briefing of OPSB was similar to the briefing that TPS provided to TPSB. Towards the end of his time in office, he told OPSB that OPS could likely resolve the Freedom Convoy within a week of receiving the 1800 officers OPS had requested.

On February 14, Chief Sloly arranged for OPP to provide an intelligence briefing to OPSB. The briefing was scheduled for the morning of February 15 but was postponed and Chief Sloly was not aware if it occurred after he resigned. Chief Sloly characterized the briefing as providing a significantly greater intelligence briefing to OPSB, well beyond what the Morden Report contemplated.

Chief Sloly believed that he provided OPSB with the information that it needed to discharge its oversight function, and that he went beyond the level of information that he would normally provide.

February 14 Federal Emergency Declaration

On February 14, the federal government declared a public order emergency under the *Emergencies Act*. The federal government did not inform Chief Sloly that it was considering declaring an emergency or explicitly consult him.

Chief Sloly did provide information in conversations with provincial and federal government representatives about the resources and capabilities OPS needed, and suspects that these conversations would have helped to inform the federal government's decisions concerning the *Emergencies Act*. Specifically, Chief Sloly participated in several phone calls with federal Deputy Minister of Public Safety Rob Stewart, Mr. Kanellakos, Mr. Di Tommaso, Commissioner Lucki and others. Call participants provided updates on their situation and what resources they needed. Police resource needs and the lack of tow trucks available in Ottawa and Coutts were a frequent topic of conversation. Chief Sloly made it clear on these calls that the number one thing that the OPS needed were more police officers – secondarily more heavy tow trucks. Chief Sloly also discussed the possibility of the federal government using a negotiator or interlocutor to help resolve the local events. Chief Sloly was asked by Mr. Stewart to share information gathered by OPS's PLT negotiations to help the federal government identify possible negotiators. Chief Sloly also recalls a discussion with multiple federal officials, including Ministers Bill Blair and Marco Mendicino over the weekend of February 12th. The OPS's towing capacity was discussed at this meeting.

February 15 Resignation

Chief Sloly decided to resign on the morning of February 15 and finalized his resignation arrangement with OPSB around 4:00 p.m. that day. There were a variety of reasons for this decision but the primary reason was public safety

⁷⁶ OPS00011610.



It was clear to Chief Sloly that a significant public safety concern facing the City was the growing lack of confidence in the service, and by extension in him as Chief.

Public trust is an essential element in public safety. Every day that passed increased the risk to public safety (including the safety of OPS members and members of partner agencies who were working alongside the OPS).

This increasing lack of confidence was the result of a number of factors including the prolonged Convoy events and their negative impacts on the residents, businesses, service providers and city workers. There were also misleading comments about the OPS and their commitment to ending the demonstration made by public officials that were reported in mainstream media and fueled misinformation and disinformation on social media.

Chief Sloly was concerned that the growing lack of confidence in the OPS was impacting the speed at which the requested resources were being sent to the OPS, which was in turn delaying its ability to end the local Convoy related events. He felt that if he removed himself from the equation, it could help in some way to address this lack of confidence and thereby accelerate the arrival of resources.

When asked what the role the OPSB played in his decision, Chief Sloly stated that there were some OPSB members who implicitly or explicitly expressed that they had lost confidence in him. While some Board members were very supportive, others sought his departure from the organization. Chief Sloly also felt that his efforts in carrying out his change mandate for the OPS were undermined as a result of the personal agendas as well as acts of discrimination (including racism) of a very small but very influential element within the OPS. This was an unfortunate situation that had been occurring over Chief Sloly's entire tenure in office and for most of his career in policing.

While there were many pressures imposed on Chief Sloly that were factors in his decision, the most important factor was restoring confidence in the OPS such that it could obtain the resources needed to end the three week old national security crisis as rapidly as possible.

Chief Sloly felt that at the time of his resignation decision, he had helped ensure that the OPS had the core elements in place to end the occupation – the right plan, the right level of multi-agency integration and right level of resources requested. He believed that his decision to leave office would help further accelerate the arrival of the resources needed to safely and successfully end the local Convoy events and return the City of Ottawa to a state of normalcy.

[Lessons and Recommendations for the Future](#)

Chief Sloly does not believe that OPS could have done anything materially differently on a big-picture level given the unprecedented national security crisis that the OPS was faced with. The issues which allowed the occupation to play out as it did related to



structural deficits that have existed in public institutions, including policing and national security, for years.

In retrospect, Chief Sloly wishes that he had expanded upon his February 2 public statement that there might not be a policing solution to the situation in Ottawa. Chief Sloly's intent was to communicate that, while the OPS could not, with the resources available at that time, bring about a safe, lawful, and successful end to the demonstration alone, it would continue to do everything that it could to manage the crisis until it received the help it needed to bring it to an end. During the interview, he commented that police do not solve problems on their own and need to partner with other agencies to do so. Chief Sloly appreciates that his statement may not have effectively communicated his determination to find a solution in collaboration with OPS's partners and may have left a vacuum for people to insert cynical, inappropriate, and untrue content about what he meant.

There were structural problems in the national security, police and justice that long predated the Convoy events and were badly exposed during this paradigm shifting and unprecedented event – so there need to be recommendations to address these issues.

At the February 5th OPSB meeting, Chief Sloly noted that “something has changed in our democratic fabric, and we do not have the legislation or the resources to manage such situations. We do not have the justice system framework or the needed coordination between all levels of government to predictably manage these demonstrations going forward. We will have to assess the fundamental principles of the PSA and the way it is integrated with other acts to determine how we can deal with such situations in the future.”

Based on Chief Sloly's 30 years in policing and his direct experience in the Convoy events, here are his core recommendations for the Commission to consider:

1. Create a *Charter*-based threshold for police interdiction in the context of large-scale demonstrations with the potential to become occupations.
2. Create National Police Standards (for all areas of policing but specifically for Emergency Preparedness, Incident Command System, Critical Incident Command and Integrated Command).
3. Create a National Police College to Improve consistency in training for all Canadian police services.
4. Create National/Provincial Police Inspectorate General to audit, assess and publicly report on the level of compliance with the national standards and the effectiveness of all Canadian police services.
5. Create a new National Security Framework (specifically for CSIS) with an aligned and supporting Intelligence Led Policing Framework for all Canadian police services.



6. Make needed investments in national security agencies and all Canadian police services (including financial investments).
7. Invest in the health and wellness for employees of all national security agencies/Canadian police services (including financial investments).
8. Address the increasing risks/harms associated to misinformation/disinformation campaigns, online radicalization to violence and societal polarization.
9. Amend the Police Services Acts across Canada to reflect the policing of public order issues of the scale that are now occurring in Canada.
10. Address Police of Jurisdiction Issues in National Capital Region and invest in INTERSECT (including financial investments).
11. Ensure future federal government decisions to invoke the *Emergencies Act* involve explicit, direct, and recorded consultation with the involved Police Services of jurisdiction.
12. Consider all the above recommendations in relation to the unique status and needs of Indigenous nations/communities and their police services.